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Introduction
Frank A.G. den Butter and Henri L.F. de Groot
However, the choice between market and 
hierarchy is not the only strategic decision 
the management can make in the 
organization of its production process. 
Many intermediate forms are conceivable, 
so-called hybrid forms of organization. 
These include cooperative partnerships, 
alliances, licensing and franchising. As part 
of our honors course ‘The economics of 
globalization: A transaction costs 
perspective’ taught at VU University 
Amsterdam, some very good papers on  
this subject of hybrid organizations were 
written and presented by the students in 
the spring of 2013. This volume contains a 
selection of three of these papers which 
were presented in a workshop in The 
Hague early this year. During the workshop 
a number of interested parties from 
academia, government and the private 
sector were exchanging views about these 
organizational innovations which aim at 
reducing transaction costs in production 
service industries.
The paper by Jeroen de Nie titled “The 
relation between licensing and transaction 
costs” looks at the relationship between 
transaction costs and licensing. Licensing, 
where standards, ideas or rules developed 
by one company are used by another 
company, can be seen as a hybrid form 
of organization between market and 
hierarchy. The paper describes how 
various aspects of the economic theory of 
transaction costs, such as “asset specificity” 
and uncertainty about institutions and 
about technological progress, may affect 
the strategic choice to use licensing in the 
organization of production or provision 
of services. The specific way in which the 
contracts of the licensing are designed and 
the extent to which they are enforced, play 
an important role in this hybrid form of 
organization.
The paper by Erik Blokland titled 
“Goodwill and transaction costs” is about 
how goodwill can be related to transaction 
cost economics. This relationship is twofold. 
Goodwill mainly plays a role when a 
company is offered for sale, or in the 
valuation of the company in the event of  
a merger or acquisition. In that case, the 
goodwill is part of the transaction costs 
when a company is sold or in the event  
of a merger or acquisition. Secondly - and 
this seems even more relevant from the 
perspective of transaction cost economics - 
goodwill can be seen as an asset on the 
balance sheet of the company, which 
reflects the valuation of the skill of 
organizing a company’s production and 
sales at low transaction costs.  
In the organization of production processes, a distinction can be made between 
production through the market and through the hierarchy. Transaction costs are 
decisive for the choice between these two forms of organization. When the 
transaction costs through the market are higher than through the hierarchy, it is best 
to organize production within the firm. The reverse is true for the choice of 
organization through the hierarchy. This philosophy is based on the pioneering work 
on firm behavior of Ronald Coase (Coase, 1937), Nobel laureate in economics in 1991, 
and deceased in 2013 at the age of 102. In addition, Ronald Coase can also be 
considered as one of the founding fathers of the New Institutional Economics. 
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Changed circumstances may make it 
necessary to adjust the organization. It 
appears that in making these decisions  
the balancing of the various types of 
transaction costs, as distinguished in 
transaction cost economics, plays an 
important role. But in practice decisions  
are mainly made on the basis of intuition: 
no real comparative calculations are made 
with respect to transaction costs when 
making decisions on the actual way of 
organizing the relocation service. This 
paper provides an excellent example of 
how a case study on transaction 
management can look like. Unique is that 
this case considers a company from the 
business services sector and not, as in  
most previous cases, a company from the 
manufacturing industry.
In the discussion of the papers, and more in 
general in the discussion of the way 
transaction costs can be managed in hybrid 
organizations, the following questions were 
considered:
1.  In what sense can transaction 
management contribute to the practice 
of a good choice of the organizational 
form in different circumstances and 
institutional environments? How about 
the distinction between production and 
services sectors?
2.  What is the role of government in the 
valorisation of knowledge about hybrid 
organization in the business sector?
3.  To what extent can the knowledge of 
hybrid organizational forms such as 
choices for public-private partnerships, 
also be important for the government 
itself?
Regarding the first question, all papers 
show the importance of theoretical 
arguments of transaction cost economics  
In that sense, goodwill reflects the 
investments in all sorts of hidden assets 
(“intangible assets”), which contribute to 
give the company a competitive advantage 
in efficiently achieving revenues and 
making profits. More specifically, the paper 
looks at two practical aspects, viz. (i) the 
valuation of goodwill among the four 
largest Dutch banks, and (ii) the valuation 
of the brand name in multinational 
companies with a strong brand. Such a 
brand name and the associated reputation 
is a good example of “invisible capital” that 
may bring about a reduction in transaction 
costs. Goodwill and appreciation of the 
brand name seem closely related, but 
prove not to be identical.
The paper by Remo Corstjens titled “TCE 
and foreign entry mode of service firms:  
a case study in the international relocation 
industry” describes how transaction costs 
play a role in strategic decisions of an 
international relocation company on the 
way the services abroad are organized with 
or without local partners. There are four 
distinct ways for organizing relocation 
services in foreign countries, namely (i) 
through the market, (ii) through a strategic 
alliance, (iii) through franchising, and (iv) 
through an own subsidiary. The first and 
last of these ways of organizing correspond 
to the respective Coasian archetypes: the 
market versus the hierarchy. The other two 
modes of organization are hybrid forms 
between market and hierarchy. The finding 
in the paper is that in the international 
relocation industry all four types of 
organization are used depending on the 
circumstances. The company of the case 
study appears to have a flexible and 
dynamic management with respect to the 
choice of the organizational form.  
in strategic decision making on what 
organisational form to select. Yet it is clear 
that such choices are almost always made 
in a rather intuitive way, without formal and 
quantitative calculations of the various 
transaction costs that will be encountered 
in different situations and with different 
types of organization. However, it seems 
that a more formal procedure of balancing 
various alternatives, like in the case of cost/
benefit analysis, could be a useful 
contribution of transaction management to 
strategic decision making of firms in such 
complicated make or buy and location 
decisions. Most certainly, just as in cost-
benefit analysis, a decision will never solely 
be based on sheer numerical outcomes, as 
always the gut feelings of the entrepreneur 
about uncertainties and challenges, which 
cannot be quantified nor codified, will have 
the final say in the decisions. On the other 
hand, a more formal approach of 
transaction management can be helpful as 
a tool which may provide support to the 
complex entrepreneurial decision making 
process. Here there may be an analogy 
with forecasters using econometric models. 
Their forecasts about economic 
developments – e.g., on economic growth 
in the next two years – are never solely 
based on the computer output from their 
models, but all kinds of judgemental 
elements, such as forecasts of exogenous 
variables and the use of so-called add-
factors, are included in the final forecasts. 
In order to make transaction management 
more suitable for use in practice it should 
be on the research agenda to develop a 
methodology which allows the interaction 
between “hard” knowledge on transaction 
costs and intuitive entrepreneurial 
knowledge in a similar manner. The paper 
by Remo Corstjens suggests that such 
methodology should be even more flexible 
in the case of the service industry than in 
manufacturing. 
The Netherlands seems to have some 
comparative advantage in organising 
production in the hybrid form of a 
cooperation. One of the largest banks in 
the country, the Rabobank, originated as a 
cooperation and also a large multinational 
in the dairy industry, Friesland-Campina, is 
organised as a cooperation. Moreover, the 
Netherlands is a world leader in the Dance 
industry, which owes much of its success on 
the flexible way of organising Dance events 
using various kinds of hybrid forms of 
organisation (Den Butter et al., 2014; 
Joustra, 2014). This skill in being 
cooperative, and not hierarchical, in the 
way production of goods and services is 
organised in the Netherlands has to do with 
the tradition of being a trading nation 
where early in history citizens – “burghers” 
– and not monarchs were setting the rules. 
Yet it seems that making use of hybrid 
forms of organisation in modern times 
requires skills that are, at least partly, to be 
obtained through knowledge transfers. In 
that sense developing these skills and 
learning through experience to profit from 
these hybrid ways of organising economic 
activities brings about positive externalities. 
It implies that there is a role for the 
government to stimulate the development 
and transfers of this kind of organisational 
knowledge. 
The discussion by the participants of the 
workshop clarified that the government 
itself may also make use of various types of 
cooperative agreements in their activities 
which aim at safeguarding the public 
interest. Today the choice is still too much 
between doing it yourself or outsourcing 
(part of) the activities to private partners in 
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the market. Making use of in-between 
hybrid forms of cooperation may in specific 
cases bring about less (transaction) costs in 
safeguarding public interests. One of the 
participants mentioned the very practical 
example of housing of the government 
services. Another example relates to the 
way the different governmental bodies (say 
Ministries) interact: when can activities be 
better organised by common standards 
and methodologies, and when do such 
cooperative devices bring about too high 
coordination costs? Yet, also in this case, 
more knowledge should be acquired on the 
best ways the government can make use of 
the various types of hybrid organisations. 
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Introduction
Human perception on goodwill has vastly 
transformed through the last century. This 
alteration translated itself in the adoption 
of new accounting principles, adaptations 
of the definition of goodwill, and its 
increasingly paramount contribution to 
corporate valuations and acquisitions.
Dore (1983) emphasises the change in 
reflection on the concept of goodwill. 
Palgrave’s 1923 dictionary of economics 
defines goodwill as: the expectancy of a 
continuance, to the advantage of a 
successor in an established business, of the 
personal confidence, or of the habit of 
recurring to the place or premises or to the 
known business house or firm, on the part 
of a circle or connection of clients or 
customers (Palgrave, 1923). Half a century 
later, McGraw-Hill’s economic dictionary 
entails a different view on goodwill: an 
accounting term used to explain the 
difference between what a company pays 
when it buys another company and what it 
gets in the form of tangible assets 
(Greenwald, 1973). The goodwill concept is 
thereby extended to cover not just the 
benefits accruing to the purchaser of a 
business, supported by its customers, but 
also gaining from the subsequent shift from 
a competitor to monopolist – the acquired 
ability to control the customers by price-
setting (Dore, 1983). The change in the 
standard definition of this term has been 
established by the increased dominance of 
the world by large corporations and their 
accountants’ terms.
From a public policy perspective, goodwill 
accounting has also increased in 
importance (cf. Colley and Volkan, 1988). 
Currently, goodwill and other intangible 
assets constitute a substantially larger 
fraction of the value of a firm, moreover, a 
larger portion of the acquisition price of 
purchased companies, than what used to 
be the case (Chauvin and Hirschey, 1994).
The novel belief in the United States that 
goodwill suffices all elements of an asset, as 
described in the Financial Accounting 
Standards (FAS), resulted in a change of 
computing the accounting book value of 
goodwill (Henning et al., 2004). From the 
market viewpoint, goodwill was earlier 
acknowledged to be an asset and its 
information incorporated in the valuation  
of the firm (McCarthy et al., 1995).
The aim of this paper is to provide a clear 
overview of what goodwill entails and how 
it is associated with transaction costs. The 
remainder of this paper will proceed as 
follows. First, an in-depth study will be 
obtained about the phenomenon of 
goodwill. In the subsequent section, its 
connection with transaction costs will be 
revealed. This transaction costs perspective 
will entail mostly qualitative characteristics. 
Finally, a short summary and conclusion of 
the main subjects will be given. 
What is goodwill?
The purpose of this section is a sole focus 
on goodwill from accounting and financial 
points of view. First, a general picture of 
what goodwill exactly is will be portrayed. 
Second, prior research on acquisitions and 
overpayments of companies will be 
discussed. Finally, the difference between 
accounting and investor perspective on 
goodwill will be depicted. 
Goodwill is an intangible asset on the 
balance sheet of companies. Therefore it is 
an asset not physical in nature (such as 
buildings or equipment are). 
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2
Goodwill and
transaction costs 
Erik Blokland
reasons for acquisition e.g. to safeguard 
raw material supply or maintain the skills  
of high-trained scientists or talented 
managers. Tearney (1973) found that the 
most often cited reasons were 
‘accomplishing a particular market 
objective’, ‘saving time in expanding into  
a new area’, ‘acquiring management and 
technical skills’ and ‘achieving product 
diversification’ and ‘integration’. 
Churyk (2005) relates even more to the 
concept goodwill by describing reasons 
why purchasers may overpay for a target 
firm. He classifies them in two groups; the 
agency theory and the hubris motive. The 
agency motive states that managers have 
an incentive to act in their own self-interest 
at the expense of stockholders. 
Nevertheless, harming shareholders need 
not be intentional in this theory. For 
instance, when managers are not properly 
diversified, they diversify holdings of the 
firm to reduce the risk of human capital 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981). Another reason 
could be that managers will enter new 
markets in order to ascertain survival of  
the firm (Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983;  
and Jensen, 1993). In addition, when a 
manager’s job becomes endangered by 
poor performance, he has an incentive to 
enter new lines of business at which he 
feels more confident (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1989). Growth also creates promotion 
opportunities for junior managers without 
threatening the jobs of current top-level 
managers (Donaldson, 1984). 
Hubris occurs when managers issue bids 
based on inaccurate belief in their ability  
to manage the target firm or erroneous 
estimates of target firm value (Roll, 1986). 
Thereby they act against shareholders’ 
interests, since founded on these mistakes 
in judgment, the acquirer overbids.  
The hubris hypothesis has been supported 
by more recent studies; Morck et al. (1990), 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), and 
Zhang (1998). Roll (1986) also found that 
purchasers, on average, pay too much for 
targets. 
The manner of valuing goodwill once it has 
been recorded on the balance sheet has 
differed through time. Prior to 2002, it was 
an indefinite intangible asset. In other 
words, goodwill was perceived to have a 
limited useful life (i.e., legal and economic 
life). In that period, goodwill was amortised 
over its expected life cycle, similar to the 
depreciation of, for example, a production 
machine. The useful economic life of 
purchased goodwill is defined as the period 
over which the value of an acquired 
business is expected to exceed the values 
of its identifiable assets and liabilities 
(Accounting Standards Board, 1996). In the 
United States, the amortisation period had 
a maximum of 40 years (Johnson and 
Petrone, 1998). In the United Kingdom, the 
economic life was only allowed to exceed 
twenty years under strict circumstances 
(Accounting Standards Board, 1996). First, 
the durability of an intangible asset or 
business can be demonstrated and justifies 
estimating the useful economic life to 
exceed 20 years. Second, the goodwill is 
capable of continued measurement, viz. 
annual impairments will be feasible. Since 
2002, U.S. companies have had to adopt 
new accounting rules (SFAS 141 and 142). 
This implies that goodwill must be tested  
at least annually to see if its value is still 
accurate. If the asset appears less worthy 
than the management originally paid for, 
an impairment charge is required in order 
to correctly reflect the asset’s value on the 
balance sheet. The introduction of the  
rules concerned has been both ex-ante 
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It is regularly called the ‘sweat equity’ a 
company has built during its existence. 
Namely, goodwill encompasses all the 
factors above and beyond book value 
which make investors willing purchase a 
business. On the whole, it represents the 
value of brand names, patents, customer 
base loyalty, competitive position and  
other hard-to-price assets a company  
might own. Goodwill also frequently arises 
at the acquisition of a company. It 
represents an acquisition amount in excess 
of the purchased firm’s net assets valued 
on the balance sheet. Therefore the 
distinction between internally generated 
and purchase goodwill is often made (e.g., 
Chauvin and Hirschey, 1994). Normally, 
banks do not finance intangible assets such 
as goodwill. Either (other) investors or the 
firm itself is responsible for financing 
goodwill. 
In case of excess payment for a company,  
a positive value of goodwill will emerge on 
the balance sheet. However, if a business is 
acquired for a price below the fair value of 
its identifiable assets and liabilities, the 
margin can be called ‘badwill’ or negative 
goodwill (Accounting Standards Board, 
1996). Such purchases by nature imply a 
bargain and rarely occur. 
Goodwill plays a bigger role in publicly 
traded companies than in private firms.  
This is because publicly-traded companies 
are constantly under public scrutiny and 
object to market valuation. Thus the  
actions and ethics of public firms are  
easier to see and quantify. 
Falk and Gordon (1977; 1979) analysed 
various economic factors contributing  
to goodwill. The authors identified the  
relative importance of seventeen firm 
characteristics, falling into four broad 
categories, including: superior ability to 
increase short-term cash flows, economic 
stability, good management and 
organisational structure, and ‘exclusiveness’ 
in terms of ‘brand name recognition’ and 
‘access to technology’. The most important 
characteristics appeared to be ‘good 
labour relations’, ‘managerial talents’ and 
‘production economies’. These results are 
in line with the findings of Nelson (1953) 
who argued that goodwill is associated  
with ‘customer lists, organisation costs, 
developmental costs, trademarks and 
brands, secret processes and formulas, 
patents, copyrights, licenses, franchises  
and other identifiable sources of ‘superior 
earnings power’’. 
Goodwill can be regarded as the 
discounted cash flows of current and future 
operations the firm executes or is capable 
to have (e.g., with a feasible opportunity to 
enter new markets or niches).
The capability to minimise transaction 
costs, due to aspects of goodwill such as 
good management and brand name 
recognition, is thereby financially internalised 
and quantified on the balance sheet of a 
firm. This long-term reduction in transaction 
costs could be both internal, such as being 
efficiently organised, and external, for 
example having a stable and reliable (trade) 
network. 
Sharma and Ho (2002) demonstrate that 
corporate acquisitions do not lead to 
significant improvements in post-acquisition 
operating performance. Their study 
suggests that corporate acquisitions may 
be undertaken for other than synergistic 
reasons. Earlier studies such as Mace and 
Montgomery (1962) defined deviating 
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As the HP CEO Meg Whitman publicly 
announced: ‘HP is extremely disappointed 
to find that some former members of 
Autonomy’s management team used 
accounting improprieties, misrepresentations 
and disclosure failures to inflate the 
underlying financial metrics of the company, 
prior to Autonomy’s acquisition by HP. 
These efforts appear to have been  
a willful effort to mislead investors and 
potential buyers, and severely impacted HP 
management’s ability to fairly value 
Autonomy at the time of the deal.’ 
Remarkably, both Deloitte and KPMG 
audited the financials of Autonomy, but 
neither found any irregularities. 
In 2002, AOL Time Warner admitted to 
investors that they overpaid $100 billion  
in terms of goodwill, at the time the  
merger between AOL and Time Warner.  
In result, the share value of the company 
imploded by 75%. Moreover, if a company 
is constantly writing down goodwill, it 
implies that management has made poor 
decisions. Hence investors might want to 
contemplate their investments. Therefore 
not only a single impairment but a 
sequence of write-offs can lead to a 
negative alteration in shareholders’ belief  
in the company. This disbelief often 
translates itself into a decline in share price.
A positive view on a write-off is that it also 
provides a more current value of assets on 
the balance sheet. During bubble years, 
balance sheets are signified by goodwill 
because of companies overpaying for 
assets by acquiring overpriced stock. 
Revealing the true value of those assets  
will not only improve the analysis of a 
company, moreover, what investors ought 
to pay for that stock. The attempt to 
enhance transparency since 2002,  
(e.g., Chauvin and Hirschey, 1994, and 
Jennings et al., 2001) and ex-post (e.g., 
Churyk, 2005) widely argued and 
empirically justified in scientific spheres. 
Reducing the carrying value of goodwill  
to the fair market value represents a ‘mark-
to-market’ charge; it aims to provide a 
realistic appraisal of the current market 
value rather than its book value. Therefore 
goodwill has become a definite asset; that 
is, having an unlimited useful life, although 
its value (still) is subject to change over 
time. As already recognised by the 
Accounting Standards Board in 1996, 
where goodwill and intangible assets are 
regarded as having indefinite useful 
economic lives, they should not be 
amortised. Since the introduction of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), all EU countries have to adopt their 
accounting process to the annual 
impairment tests. Therefore, the possibility 
of non-amortisation was possible prior to 
2005, yet not uniformly applied. 
A goodwill impairment charge is non-cash 
and therefore does not affect cash flows. 
However, it might entail a very poor 
estimation of the (purchased) company’s 
value and potential during the acquisition 
and negotiation phase. In the case of HP’s 
acquisition of Autonomy in 2011, it funded 
the purchase price through cash reserves. 
This decision resulted in the evaporation of 
multiple billions of dollars in shareholder 
value since the company was worth only a 
fraction of its earlier estimated value. The 
impairment of HP of an incredible amount 
of $8.8 million indicated that not only the 
poor estimation of the current management 
but rather the misrepresentation (of a 
company’s financial state) from the former 
board can result in a subsequent 
impairment (Souppouris, 2012). 
right after global recuperation of the  
dot-com bubble, therefore not only 
critically evaluates management decisions 
but also leads to better estimates of the 
true underlying value of stocks. 
Nevertheless, other investors merely  
ignore the issue entirely.
A huge write-off should, however, not by 
definition be perceived as a bad sign. 
Indeed the impairment reveals bad 
decision-making regarding corporate 
management in the past. Nevertheless,  
by taking an all-encompassing charge,  
the managers demonstrate their honesty 
and good intentions regarding future 
events of the company. Although it is a 
huge blow for current investors, it is more 
favourable for the long-run than in case of  
a series of recurring impairment charges. 
Namely, this could eventually lead to a slow 
death of the company. Moreover, it could 
create an impression of the management 
manipulating reality by intentionally not 
admitting their faults and facing the 
consequences within a single step. 
In conclusion, the level of overpayment  
and the subsequent drastic decline of 
purchased goodwill obtain most emphasis 
in scientific fields. More relevant, however, 
is the maintenance of goodwill after the 
transition of owners. Namely, this forms 
one of the major underlying causes of an 
impairment. The value of goodwill may be 
perfectly judged at time of acquisition, 
nevertheless, the responsibility is at the 
new owners to maintain, increase and, 
hence, realise their judged value. Their 
aptitude to control and convert the 
obtained assets in such a way that it will 
reach or exceed their predicted future 
outcome is therefore vital. In other words, 
the chemistry between the new 
management and all other imaginable 
facets of a company has to be at least as 
good as in (the situation of the) former 
organisation to convert the purchased 
value of the obtained assets into attained 
cash flows. As the hubris hypothesis (Roll, 
1986) addresses, overconfidence in the 
management’s ability to manage the target 
firm (at least as good as its former staff) 
often leads to write-downs after acquisition.
Huge impairments due to inflated 
overpayments during the dot-com bubble 
are often the point of reference in 
examples of goodwill scandals (e.g. the 
aforementioned AOL Time Warner merger). 
What is not taken into account in many 
critiques is that impairments after bubbles 
occur in a different market trend. This is 
essential for both goodwill estimates at the 
moment of acquisition and impairment as 
future prospects highly diverge from each 
other. In an upward market trend, market 
dynamics flourish which makes the 
perspective on future revenues rosier. This 
positive disposition of the market causes 
higher purchased goodwill at acquisitions. 
Conversely, in a declining market, near 
future revenues reach timely lows, affecting 
prospects of a company’s profit capability 
hence influencing the amount of corporate 
goodwill. Therefore the level of goodwill, 
being annually determined through 
impairments, will be highly dependent on 
the market trend in which a company 
operates. As in the previous paragraph, 
goodwill could be perfectly judged at a 
certain moment in time, the value of which 
being utterly irrelevant during different 
market evolvements. Obviously, this does 
not legitimise the entire impairment or 
‘misjudgement’ as myriad other (mostly 
non-revealed) factors affect value 
judgments of goodwill.
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if the firm already has a large amount of 
debt and is in need of more financing. 
Therefore, investors, especially of companies 
in significant debt, should carefully evaluate 
their investments. A less optimistic view 
than the income statements and balance 
sheets attempt to convey, is in such cases 
(even more) relevant.
Investors appear to routinely value tangible 
assets different than accountants (Chauvin 
and Hirschey, 1994). Moreover, investors 
place significant economic value on 
intangible assets which do not meet 
accounting criteria. These divergences 
between market and accounting valuations 
lead to undermining confidence in the 
reliability and relevance of accounting  
data. They also provide motivation to 
improve in the accounting recognition and 
valuation of intangible assets (Wyatt, 1992). 
In the study of Henning et al. (2000), the 
difference between the acquisition price 
and the pre-acquisition book value of the 
target firm’s assets is decomposed into  
four components. Investors attach a 
significantly higher weight to the segments 
going-concern and synergistic value. 
Furthermore, they are positively related 
with market value. In other words, investors 
do not write off these portions of the 
goodwill asset in the year of acquisition, 
whereas they do with the other two (i.e., 
write-up and overvaluation). The value of 
the target as a going-concern, or stand-
alone entity measures the difference 
between the target’s pre-acquisition market 
value six days prior to the acquisition and 
the target’s fair market value of assets. The 
market’s appraisal of the synergistic value 
created by the acquisition pertains the 
combined cumulative abnormal returns to 
the target and the acquirer for the 11 days 
Although goodwill is regarded as a definite 
asset nowadays, several remarks can be 
made. Goodwill is very hard to estimate 
accurately since its value can come from 
abstract and often unreliable phenomena. 
The ideas and people within an organisation, 
for instance, are both not guaranteed to 
work for a company forever. Therefore, 
different experts often end up with 
different valuations. In addition, the 
accounting rules (SFAS 141 and SFAS 142) 
allow considerable space for companies in 
allocating goodwill and determining its 
(carrying) value. For example, there are still 
possibilities within the allocation process to 
manipulate purposely in order to (unjustly) 
pass the impairment test. As managements 
still attempt to avoid these charge-offs, 
accounting scandals will certainly (re)occur.
Allocating goodwill to business units and  
its valuation is often a process hidden from 
investors. This non-transparent procedure 
provides the opportunity for manipulation. 
Moreover, companies are not obliged to 
disclose what exactly is determined to be 
the fair value of goodwill, which would  
help investors making a more informed 
investment decision. 
An incentive to avoid impairment charges 
could be the negative effect on the 
company’s ability to refinance its debts. 
The majority of lenders require the 
borrowing institute to maintain certain 
operating ratios. If a company does not 
adhere to these constraints (i.e. loan 
covenants), it could result in default of the 
loan agreement. In that case, the lender 
has all the power in renegotiation and 
repayment stages: for example, the investor 
has the right to demand an immediate 
repayment of the loan. Such a default (i.e., 
rejection of financing) is even more harmful 
centred on the acquisition announcement. 
The residual component depicts the 
difference between recorded goodwill and 
the synergy and going-concern 
components. Regressing the market value 
of equity on the three components indicates 
a negative relation between the residual 
component and market value, suggesting 
that overpayments reduce firm value. 
The introduction of the new accounting 
standards (in 2002) ought to provide the 
investors more transparency about 
acquisition costs and more accountability 
for bad acquisitions. Hayn and Hughes1 
(2006), however, found that available 
disclosures on acquired entities do not 
provide financial statement users with 
information to adequately predict future 
write-offs. In addition, goodwill write-offs 
lag behind the economic impairment of 
goodwill by an average of three to four 
years, with one-third of the companies 
examined up to ten years. These revelations 
have two implications on aforementioned 
subjects. First, the delay entails the 
avoidance of write-offs being actually 
acknowledged at a certain point of time, 
indicating accounting manipulation. This 
finding is consistent with the results of 
Henning et al. (2004): U.S. firms delaying 
goodwill write-offs. Second, the attempted 
transparency has still not been attained 
since accounting manipulation and, 
consequently, inconclusive disclosures do 
not lead to the obtainment of current fair 
value of assets, essentially needed for 
investors to critically assess their (potential) 
holdings. Nevertheless, Chauvin and 
Hirschy (1994) state that, despite their  
well-documented limitations, accounting 
goodwill number can be perceived useful  
if investors include them in the valuation  
of individual firms. Accordingly, they can 
capture important elements of a firm’s 
intangible assets.
Gu and Lev (2011) discover that the root 
cause of many goodwill write-offs is the 
buyers’ overpriced shares at acquisition. 
Overpriced shares incentivise managers  
to exploit the overpricing by acquiring 
businesses, often spending more than  
the acquisition’s synergies, leading to 
subsequent goodwill write-offs. They  
found the following patterns: firstly, share 
overpricing is strongly and positively 
related to the intensity of corporate 
purchases and the growth of accounting 
goodwill. Secondly, share overpricing 
predicts goodwill write-offs and their 
magnitude. Thirdly, acquisitions by 
overpriced companies are often ill-advised, 
aggravating the post-acquisition negative 
returns of buyers beyond the reversal of 
the overpricing. Therefore, goodwill  
write-offs highlight a dysfunctional 
investment strategy. 
Transaction costs
This section concentrates on the economics 
of transaction costs in relation with goodwill. 
After a brief definition of transaction costs 
and its forms, the connection will be made 
with goodwill.
Transaction costs involve all of the costs 
associated with conducting exchanges 
between firms and can be decomposed 
into ex-ante transaction costs, or search 
and contracting costs, and ex-post 
contracting costs, or monitoring and 
enforcement costs (cf. Williamson, 1985; 
Hennart, 1993; and North, 1990). 
1  The sample comprises acquisitions that occurred both before and after the 
introduction of the SFAS 142.
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A distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
transaction costs can be made (Den Butter, 
2011). Hard transaction costs include 
observable costs such as transport costs, 
import duties and customs tariffs. Soft 
transaction costs consists of all costs of 
unwritten laws, trust building, networking, 
risk costs, making and monitoring contracts, 
information costs, etc. Since the typical 
ethereal nature of the assets forming (the 
value of) goodwill make the associated 
costs very difficult to observe, (gaining) 
goodwill thus represents soft transaction 
costs. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in 
following paragraphs, accounting and tax 
laws exert influence on goodwill as well. 
Therefore hard transaction costs are 
involved in the attainment of goodwill and 
its consequent value.
Chauvin and Hirschey (1994) reflect on 
important measurable implications of 
goodwill. For instance, firms with a high-
quality reputation reduce customer search 
costs. Conversely, firms with a reputation 
for low quality increase necessary customer 
search costs. The time and (thus) money 
invested in obtaining (loyal) customers can 
be seen as transaction costs – which a good 
firm reputation reduces. 
Given the fact that consumers often have 
difficulty with accurately assessing firm 
quality, firms have an urge to signal quality 
to consumers in the course of investment 
and marketing decisions. Hence, high-
quality firms can be expected to invest 
vastly in Research & Development (R&D), 
brand-name advertising and other 
reputational purposes. The value of such 
investments would be vanished in case of 
the production of low quality goods. 
Therefore a great (financial) commitment  
to these expenditure domains is 
More recent research has also acknowledged 
transaction costs to occur within firms (e.g., 
Dyer, 1997; Madhok, 1996; and Stavins, 
1995). The conception of transaction costs 
will therefore encompass both intra-firm 
and inter-firm transactions in the remainder 
of this paper. 
Goodwill forms part of the intangible 
assets, which includes the (distinctive) 
capabilities for a company to hold 
transaction costs low. This could be trust  
or reputation, facilitating transactions,  
as will be further discussed. Moreover, 
intangible capital such as talent, specific 
business insights, field experience and 
excellent teamwork form possibilities. 
Hence this variety of aptitudes is quantified 
since an accurate estimation of goodwill is 
required on the balance sheet. 
Components of goodwill can reduce 
transaction costs both within and between 
entities. For instance, high human capital, 
such as great teamwork, and business 
intelligence increases productivity by 
reducing transaction costs between 
departments and among employees 
(Ciborra and Olson, 1988). As the word 
implies, internally generated goodwill 
therefore is able to reduce internal 
transaction costs. The value of brand names 
also appertains to goodwill. As discussed 
further, a good brand name facilitates 
cooperation with other corporations and 
thereby reduces the transaction costs to 
find and work with a business partner. 
Furthermore, customer base loyalty 
reduces the transaction costs compared to 
exchanges with non-loyal consumers. In 
other words, goodwill is able to reduce 
both internal and external transaction costs.
demonstrated to maintain the provision  
of high-quality goods. This leads to the 
expectation of advertising and R&D 
expenditures giving rise to valuable 
intangible capital. Moreover, empirical 
evidence demonstrated that expenditures 
on R&D and advertising both exert a 
positive influence on goodwill (Chauvin and 
Hirschey, 1994). This influence is quantified 
in the study of Cleeve (2009) in which 
goodwill is proxied by the ratio of media 
advertising to sales of a company. If such 
aspects of valuable reputational capital are 
captured by current accounting practice, 
goodwill numbers will exert a positive 
influence on net income and the market 
value. However, according Chauvin and 
Hirschey (1994), a conflict between negative 
reporting effects and positive economic 
effects obstructs determining the economic 
influence of accounting goodwill data on 
net income. In the eyes of the author of this 
very paper, the usage of valid control 
variables for economic effects could clear 
up this causal ambiguity. 
Accounting goodwill numbers are therefore 
seen as a functional, albeit imperfect, 
indicator of intangible assets, which 
intensifies profitability (Chauvin and Hirschey, 
1994). Similarly, accounting goodwill 
numbers are regarded as a potential 
indicator of the essential intangible asset 
dimension of the value of the firm. 
Therefore the inclusion of goodwill on the 
balance sheet, in particular if subdivided in 
different expenditure sections, could be 
time-saving to approximate the amount of 
intangible assets (in comparison with less 
accurate proxies). In other words, the 
accounting goodwill numbers of a firm 
reduce the transaction costs for an external 
party (e.g. an investor) to obtain information 
about the size of the (most important) 
intangible assets (and possibly future 
profits) possessed by a firm. Furthermore,  
it appears that companies have revealed 
new information about the value of 
goodwill to market participants since the 
introduction of SFAS 142 (Li et al., 2006).  
A significant negative correlation between 
an impairment loss and post-acquisition 
returns of impairment firms was also found. 
This increased market efficiency, due to  
the new accounting rules, also reduces the 
transaction costs of obtaining an accurate 
view on the actual goodwill and returns of  
a firm. 
Moreover, investors regard these 
admittedly imperfect data as proxy useful 
for (the influence of) amongst others good 
management, brand-name recognition and 
good customer relations. One can therefore 
infer that accounting goodwill numbers 
offer a useful perspective on the hard-to-
measure reputational value component of 
the economic value of the firm. Naturally, 
this very data is commonly believed to 
curtail transaction costs to estimate the 
(relative) reputational constituent and 
significance of a firm. 
The aforementioned implications on 
transaction costs thus reduce the time and 
can increase the accuracy in the decision-
making process for investors. Goodwill 
arises at a transaction, namely at an 
acquisition or merger. It thereby forms part 
of the costs in the trade of companies. 
Bugeja and Gallery (2006) focus on the 
perception on the representation of this 
very part of the total costs of a corporation. 
They discover that the value relevance of 
acquired goodwill is vanished three years 
after the acquisition. The interpretation of 
this result suggests either that the market 
takes approximately three years to realize 
that the balance of goodwill will not result 
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by U.K. firms appear to be associated  
with not having to amortise goodwill to 
earnings. The national differences in 
accounting impact differentially on 
managerial behavior. Therefore the 
difference in premiums offered can,  
again, be attributed to the transaction  
cost implications of distinct accounting 
principles. However, the first steps to 
convergence of IFRS (i.e. international 
accounting standards) and Japanese 
Generally Accepted Accounting Standards 
(GAAP) were set in December 2009 (IFRS, 
2014). Therefore, the validity of this 
difference in accounting standards, hence 
its implications on merger premia, in Japan 
and Germany (honouring the IFRS) could 
be questioned in the following decades. 
Trust is one of the most recognised aspects 
of goodwill in relation with transaction 
costs. For example, goodwill trust, defined 
as the ability to rely on customers to help  
in ways not required by the company’s 
agreement with them, is significantly 
associated with cost reduction (Sako and 
Helper, 1997). High trust was linked to the 
fact that suppliers were able to increase the 
frequency of delivery without increasing 
costs in the U.S. and Japan. In Europe, high 
goodwill trust significantly enhanced Just In 
Time (JIT) delivery. Furthermore, perceived 
trustworthiness reduces transaction costs 
and is correlated with greater information 
sharing in supplier-buyer relationships  
(Dyer and Chu, 2003). The value created  
for transactors, in terms of lower 
transaction costs, may be substantial.
From a less logistic perspective, trust  
may also reduce transaction costs with  
an exchange partner in myriad ways. For 
instance, trust diminishes the need for 
formal contracts, being costly to write, 
in economic benefits or that the economic 
benefits of goodwill are consumed rapidly. 
The first possibility is in line with corporate 
acquisitions not achieving operational 
improvements for the merged company, 
being supported by, e.g., Sharma and Ho 
(2003). Therefore the view of investors 
rather implies the fact that the value of the 
acquired goodwill becomes a mere 
number, after three years of existence on 
the balance sheet, rather than the 
discounted future benefits of these 
intangible assets. Due to the absence of 
relevant content, one might argue that, 
after three years, it can be regarded as the 
amount of money to make the acquisition 
(i.e., transaction) possible. In other words, 
from a market perspective, the value of 
purchased goodwill purely encompasses 
the transaction costs required for the 
acquisition to take place. 
The legal implications of different 
accounting principles result in (relative)  
tax benefits. Firms located in Japan and 
Germany, for instance, enjoy advantageous 
accounting and tax treatments relative to 
U.S. based companies (Lee and Choi, 
1992). Regression analyses demonstrate 
that goodwill accounting explains merger 
premia. Although the tax benefits are 
available in both Japan and Germany,  
more favourable accounting treatments  
in Germany lead to a higher average 
premium. Therefore, U.S. acquirers, from  
a legal perspective, have higher transaction 
costs than non-U.S. acquirers with beneficial 
treatments despite the, on average, lower 
acquisition premium they pay. Choi and 
Lee (1991) also apply this comparison to 
U.S. and U.K. acquirers of U.S. target firms. 
Merger premia by U.K. purchasers were 
consistently higher than those for U.S. 
acquisitions. The higher premiums offered 
monitor and enforce (Hill, 1995). This 
relation is explained by the fact that both 
exchange partners are confident that 
payoffs will be fairly divided (Kramer, 2006). 
Thus, trust supports negotiating efficiency 
by enabling both sides to be more flexible 
in granting concessions because of the 
belief that the exchange partner will return 
value in the future (Dore, 1983). This allows 
transactors to achieve ‘serial equity’ (equity 
over a longer period of time) rather than 
requiring immediate or ‘spot equity’ 
(Ouchi, 1984; and Dyer, 1997). As a result, 
it reduces the necessity for traders to invest 
heavily in ex ante bargaining. Additionally, 
negotiations are expected to be more 
efficient because transactors will have 
greater confidence that information 
provided by the other party is truthful. 
Similarly, according to Zaheer et al. (1998), 
‘trust reduces the inclination to guard 
against opportunistic behavior.’ In other 
words, trust curtails the fear (thus 
expectancy) of deliberate misrepresentation 
on the part of the exchange partner. 
Therefore Zaheer et al. (1998) found 
support for a negative relationship between 
inter-organisational trust and negotiation 
costs. In addition, transactors are more 
likely to share valuable work-related 
information when they have developed in  
a high level of trust (Sako, 1991, Nishiguchi, 
1994, and Uzzi, 1997). Therefore the 
willingness to not only distribute truthful 
but also more valuable information 
between partners is created by trust. 
The nature of inter-organisational 
relationships depends on the interaction 
between the logic of transaction costs and 
the need for trust and interdependencies 
between exchange parties (Banduchi, 
2008). Cleeve (1997) described cultural 
differences in sharing goodwill with joint 
venture partners. Japanese corporations 
consider transaction costs to be vital at the 
decision between part and full ownership 
of their U.K. subsidiaries. The bigger the 
goodwill capital, in this study signified as 
the ‘brand name’, the more likely a Japanese 
firm is to choose for full ownership. It seems 
that those firms are particularly concerned 
about free riding by joint venture partners 
on their ‘name’. For example, most ‘big 
name’ Japanese companies operating in 
the U.K. are wholly owned by their Japanese 
parents e.g. Nissan, Sony and Toyota. For 
the U.S. based parent firms, this relation is 
statistically insignificant, implying cultural 
differences in management decisions. 
These results have three implications 
regarding transaction costs. Firstly, Japanese 
firms have joint ventured in the U.K. in 
order not to take entirely account for the 
uncertainty and risk of foreign production. 
Secondly, when companies are producing 
completely different products to those of 
the parent firm, they need inputs from local 
corporations normally engaged in this type 
of business. Thirdly, Japanese enterprises 
need to joint venture with U.K. firms to gain 
access to resources held by local firms. 
From a U.K. based firm perspective, this 
means that the transaction costs are 
relatively high to cooperate with Japanese 
firms (in the form of joint ventures) since 
they are required to possess assets non-
held by the Japanese corporation. These 
assets include, amongst others, time and 
experience in a certain business and 
knowledge of the U.K. market, entailing 
that goodwill capital is an essential predictor 
of the nature of co-operation. Furthermore, 
goodwill thereby forms a large part of the 
transaction costs to attain a joint venture 
with Japanese firms. Lastly, acquiring or 
merging with a company in an industry the 
purchaser is not active in might be result in 
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At the end of 2011 and 2012, SNS reported 
goodwill values of €1,416m and €857m, and 
SE pertains €5,089m and €3,350m, 
respectively. Therefore goodwill is worth 
27.8% and 25.5% of the SE value. Interesting 
is the fact that SNS differentiates between 
goodwill and value of business acquired 
(VOBA) in their reports. Therefore internally 
generated goodwill (respectively €553m and 
€234m) is being divided from the purchased 
goodwill (respectively €863m and €623m). 
As both did not decline proportionately, the 
change in share of total goodwill also 
changed. In both years, purchased goodwill 
formed the majority of the total goodwill; 
with 60.94% in 2011 and 72.70% in 2012. 
Therefore internally generated goodwill 
depreciated relatively more than purchased 
goodwill. Whether the impact of goodwill on 
lowering (future) transaction costs differs 
between the two, and to what extent, cannot 
be explained with the information from the 
corresponding annual reports. From a 
market perspective, internally generalised 
goodwill will have more influence as, on the 
long run, purchased goodwill is perceived to 
be the sole costs of a transaction to occur. 
Moreover, achieving operational 
improvements are often absent for the 
merged company (Sharma and Ho, 2003). 
Internally recognised goodwill will therefore 
be a better valuation of the competence to 
reduce transaction costs than purchased 
goodwill (which is initially purely determined 
by the excess payment at an acquisition). 
In case of Rabobank, the SE was €43,220m 
and €42,325m in 2011 and 2012, respectively. 
The goodwill pertained €1,903m and 
€1,523m, forming 4.40% and 3.60% of the 
total SE. 
In comparison, the reported goodwill of 
Rabobank was largest in both cases. 
lower costs than settling itself in that field. 
Therefore transaction costs might be lower 
for companies to acquire a company than 
fully account for all start-up costs. 
Moreover, the risk of failure is being spread.
From a public policy perspective, goodwill 
accounting has increased in importance 
(Colley and Volkan, 1988). At present, 
goodwill and other intangible assets 
constitute a significantly larger fraction  
of the value of a firm, moreover, a larger 
portion of the acquisition price of 
purchased companies, than used to be  
the case (Chauvin and Hirschey, 1994).  
To visualise this share of a firm’s value,  
a comparison between goodwill and 
shareholders’ equity for the largest four 
banks in the Netherlands is made. The 
information concerned is obtained from 
statements of financial position in annual 
reports of the banks2. A short analysis will 
be run on the most recent two calendar 
years. 
For ABN AMRO, the reported goodwill  
was €132 million (m) and €134m in 
respectively 2011 and 2012. The total 
shareholders’ equity (SE) comprised 
respectively €11,400m and €14,018m in 
these years. Therefore the value of  
goodwill compared to SE is 1.16% and 
0.96%.
In case of ING, its goodwill comprised 
€1,179m and €1,188m. The SE accounted 
for €34,367m and €36,669m. The share of 
goodwill in SE is therefore 3.43% and 
4.45% respectively. 
The value of ING was higher than SNS in 
2012 whereas SNS reported more in 2011. 
Remarkable is that ABN AMRO reports by 
far the lowest goodwill. Although both ING 
and Rabobank possess significantly more 
shareholders’ equity, ABN AMRO reports 
less than 10% of the goodwill value of SNS, 
whereas the SE is more than twice as large 
and four times as high in, respectively, 2011 
and 2012. Whether this utterly low goodwill 
value is due to the management’s honesty 
or genuinely substantially lower goodwill 
capital remains unanswered. As a result,  
the value of goodwill in relation to the SE  
is relatively low for ING and fairly high for 
SNS whereas the moderate share between 
3.50% and 4.50% is present in case of ABN 
AMRO and Rabobank. 
For ABN AMRO and ING, their reported 
goodwill slightly increased whereas the 
value of goodwill for the remaining two 
banks heavily decreased. 
Once more, an analysis is conducted on 
four companies, this time from different 
industries. They all share a tremendously 
high brand value, as they form part of the 
top 10 companies of the Best Global Brands 
2011 ranking composed by Interbrand3.  
As the value of brand names (and corporate 
reputation) appertains goodwill, it is 
interesting how the estimated values of 
corporate brand names relate to the 
reported goodwill on the balance sheets of 
these years. Therefore the brand value and 
reported goodwill of 2011 are compared 
for the following companies: Coca-Cola, 
IBM, General Electrics and Disney. 
Before the actual results are presented,  
the difference between brand value and 
brand equity has to be made, as explained 
by Tiwari (2010). Brand value is how 
management and shareholders value the 
brand. It represents the net present value 
of future cash flows from a branded product 
minus the net present value of future cash 
flows from a similar product. Brand equity 
is what a brand is worth to customers. It is  
a set of elements that help distinguish one 
brand from another e.g. brand associations.
As goodwill is more relevant to shareholders 
and management than consumers, and the 
first two having formed the perspectives in 
this paper thus far, the author decided to 
compare goodwill with brand value rather 
than brand equity. 
First placed Coca-Cola mainly produces  
in the beverage industry and reported 
$12,219m of goodwill. As they produce 
beverages which are consumed in both 
economical highs and lows, Coca-Cola  
has a relatively stable return through time. 
As Falk and Gordon (1979) described 
‘economic stability’ as one of the main 
characteristics of the value of goodwill,  
this could well be an explanation of their 
goodwill value. Interbrand estimated the 
brand value to be $71,861m which is 
significantly higher than the reported 
goodwill. 
Following Coca-Cola on the rankings,  
IBM concentrates its activities on Business 
Services and obtained $69,905m of 
estimated brand value. Again, the brand 
value is substantially higher than the 
reported goodwill, being $26,213m in 
2011. Media magnate Disney was ranked 
ninth by an approximation $29,018m. The 
value of goodwill in 2011 was relatively 
close with $24,145m.
2   Available at http://www.abnamro.com/nl/about-abn-amro/ 
reports-and-reviews/index.html.
3  Available at http://www.gfmag.com/tools/global-database/
economic-data/11936-best-global-brands.html#axzz2X8REk3Bg.
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Interesting is the fact that Coca-Cola 
reported the smallest amount of money  
on the goodwill account, nevertheless,  
was estimated the highest brand value. 
However, a small value of goodwill is 
nothing bad since impairments typically 
imply a decrease in goodwill. As this affects 
the earnings and thus profit of a company, 
keeping the value of goodwill low is often 
regarded as a safer option. Moreover, 
higher goodwill implies more susceptibility 
to impairments, as it has to account for 
more value.
If one compares the reported goodwill of 
the biggest brands to the Dutch banks,  
that person will conclude that the goodwill 
of those banks in 2011 did not exceed 
$2,000m. Coca-Cola, demonstrating by far 
the lowest accounting goodwill among the 
non-banking companies in study, exposes 
goodwill approximately 6 times greater 
than the abovementioned amount. An 
explanation of this difference could be  
the following. Banks make profit on the 
spread between the received and their 
invested capital. Coca-Cola produces a 
large variety of products rather than the 
fairly homogenous (financial) products of 
banks. The Coca-Cola Company sells a 
myriad of brands, therewith obtaining a 
high potential for growing cash flows.  
In the banking sector, the biggest 
corporations such as JP Morgan, Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley are able to 
differentiate from others by functioning as 
leading underwriter in a deal (e.g. issuing 
new stock). Therefore they can ask higher 
fees than the average bank, being a 
capability forthcoming from the brand 
name and reputation. This could therefore 
end up on a balance sheet. The Dutch 
banks, however, are too small to offer this 
service and thereby their cash flow 
Lastly, General Electrics became fifth with  
a brand value of $42,808m and reported 
goodwill of $72,625m in the very same 
year. Thereby this company, active in 
various industries, deviates from other 
three companies as the reported goodwill 
is actually higher than their brand value. 
The fact that they produce goods in 
diversified industries indicates their 
potential to expand to and grow in new 
markets, of which good management and 
networking may be explanations to 
(currents) success. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, all these factors 
contribute to the amount of goodwill.
If the calculations of Interbrand appear to 
be correct, the goodwill of the first three 
companies would be undervalued. Namely, 
brand (name) value only forms part of the 
total value of goodwill. Hence the value of 
reported goodwill should at least be as 
high as the amount provided in the rankings. 
A possible explanation could be that the 
IFRS restricts the variety of developments 
in a company to represent goodwill. 
Therefore not all the value of the 
developments concerned can add value  
to goodwill on the balance sheet. 
However, the results of brand value 
estimations should be interpreted with care 
as both the amount of value and, hence, 
the rankings differ substantially from other 
ranking lists. For instance, Marlboro forms 
part of the top 10 brands in the 2011 
ranking of MillwardBrown Optimor4 whereas 
it does not in the case of Interbrand. 
Moreover, the reported brand value of 
Disney is judged $12,000m less in the list  
of MillwardBrown. 
generation is relatively limited, explaining 
lower reported goodwill. Therefore market 
capitalisation, reputation and homogeneity 
of products and services offered are the 
main reasons for the difference in goodwill 
value in this comparison.
Conclusion
Goodwill is generated at times of 
transactions. More specifically, the value  
is created at mergers and acquisitions  
when it is being approximated and 
subsequently paid for. Furthermore, 
goodwill has become an increasingly 
substantial component of the total costs  
of a company. 
Goodwill accounting and recent 
impairments remained, despite several 
attempts (by for example Accounting 
Boards), rather controversial, leading to 
different perspectives on the subject 
matter. This was mainly due to the non-
transparent procedure of valuing goodwill 
and several accounting scandals in this 
sphere.
Factors of goodwill have been scientifically 
identified, of which many are neatly related 
to transaction costs. For instance, goodwill 
comprises the (intangible) ability to 
generate future cash flows and holding 
transaction costs low. Aspects such as  
good management, stable markets and 
networking enable these capabilities to 
exist both within and between firms. This 
ability of a firm is also highly influenced by 
its management, making it a challenge for 
newly appointed managers (at corporate 
transactions) to convert the expectancies 
and current value of goodwill into realised 
cash flows. 
Trust and reputation are highly valued 
aspects of goodwill as it facilitates 
transactions between both business 
partners and consumers. Therefore better 
goodwill results in (a) lower (need for soft) 
transaction costs. Co-operation with local 
firms abroad appears to be influenced by 
culture, having several implications on 
transaction costs for and the form of 
interaction with big brands. Hard transaction 
costs can be found in more and less 
favourable accounting and tax standards 
regarding acquisitions across nations.
The value of goodwill varies between the 
3% and 25% of total shareholders’ equity  
at the largest Dutch banks. The value of 
goodwill at the biggest brands in other 
sectors form a multiple of that of banks  
due to, amongst others, higher market 
share, reputation and homogeneity of 
goods produced. 
4  Available at http://www.millwardbrown.com/libraries/ 
optimor_brandz_files/2011_brandZ_top100_report.sflb.ashx.
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Introduction
Firms increasingly trade in tasks rather than 
products (Den Butter, 2012). No longer are 
products solely produced in-house, but 
firms specialize on distinct tasks in 
production and outsource other tasks.  
This asks from companies to change their 
ways in which they organize their 
transactions. There are multiple ways in 
which companies can divide tasks. 
Examples are joint ventures, partnerships 
and licensing. What makes licensing 
especially interesting is that it does not 
involve the selling of tangible goods, but 
the transfer of knowledge. Through this, 
licensing provides an interesting 
opportunity to divide tasks between 
companies. That is, via licensing, the 
innovation process can be performed by a 
different company than the production 
process.
This paper investigates the consequences 
of choosing licensing with respect to 
transaction costs. The question is what are 
the environmental conditions that make 
licensing a viable choice. In the first part I 
explain what licensing precisely is and 
elaborate on what specific circumstances 
lead to companies to choose for licensing. 
In the next part I elaborate on the concept 
of transaction costs and the role of hybrids 
in keeping transaction costs low. Then I 
introduce a transaction costs framework 
that links transaction attributes with 
institutional arrangements and governance 
structures to minimize transaction costs. 
The last section applies this framework to 
licensing in order to find out what the 
relationship is between licensing and 
transaction costs.
Licensing
Traditionally, firms sell tangible products.  
With licensing, it is not a physical product  
that is sold, but rather the right to use an 
intellectual property right owned by the  
selling firm. Intellectual property is what is 
called “the creations of the mind” (WIPO, 
n.d.). Examples are patent rights, trademarks, 
copyrights, design rights and database rights. 
Roughly speaking, patents protect inventions, 
trademarks protect signs of products and 
services, copyrights protect creative 
expressions, design rights protect the  
external appearance of products and  
database rights protect compiled data in 
databases (Jansen, 2013). 
Typically, R&D efforts of companies are capital 
intensive and long term investments (Atun et 
al., 2007). A strong incentive for firms to engage 
in R&D is to differentiate from competitors 
through innovation (Atun et al., 2007). However, 
they are only willing to invest in R&D when 
their results are safeguarded against imitation 
and copying. This is where intellectual property 
rights come in. These allow firms to not only 
sell their products and thus their patrimonial 
rights, but also their intangible innovations 
and processes. This furthers the possibilities 
to capitalize on innovation, since there are 
limits to what one firm can produce. By 
involving other firms in the utilization of the 
innovation, the innovating firm can increase 
total production output by producing itself,  
as well as let licensees produce. Another 
option is to choose to specialize in innovation 
and leave the production to companies that 
are specialized in production. This is especially 
relevant, because it is only worthwhile to  
invest in R&D when a company has the 
complementary capacities (i.e. marketing, 
competitive manufacturing and after-sales 
support) to create value from there 
innovations (Teece, 1988).
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Licensing and
transaction costs
Jeroen de Nie
to minimize transaction costs and therefore 
maximize performance (Yang et al., 2012).
Transaction Attributes & Environmental 
Conditions
Transaction attributes are characteristics  
of transactions that determine transaction 
costs (Ménard, 2008). According to Ménard 
(2008) the commonly used transaction 
attributes are asset specificity, uncertainty 
and frequency. Asset specificity refers to 
the degree to which investments made in  
a transaction are transferable to other 
transactions without loss of value (Ménard, 
2008). Investments made before and during 
the transaction differ in their ability to be 
readily deployed in other transactions 
(Riordan and Williamson, 1985). For 
example, investments that are made to 
negotiate the terms of the transaction are 
not readily deployable in other transactions 
when the negotiations are terminated. 
Furthermore, certain costs incurred during 
the transaction do not yield benefits when 
they are transferred to other transactions 
(e.g., transportation costs). This results in 
the party that has these sunk costs invested 
in the transaction to have a serious stake in 
the continuation of the relationship 
(Riordan and Williamson, 1985). Because 
contracts can be renegotiated with mutual 
consent, there is a possibility to divide the 
rent on this sunk investment (Malcomson, 
1997). This in turn can lead to hold-up 
behavior by the party who has not made 
these specific investments (Malcomson, 
1997). 
Another transaction attribute is uncertainty. 
Uncertainty refers to the beforehand 
unknown outcome of the transaction due 
to agent’s behavior, organizational 
deficiencies, inadequate institutions and 
the state of nature (Ménard, 2008). Lastly, 
the frequency refers to the number of times 
a certain transaction takes place (Ménard, 
2008). However, the effect of frequency of 
a transaction has not been extensibly 
researched and several studies have found 
no relation between frequency and 
governance structure (Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997). Therefore I will not use this 
concept in this paper. Asset specificity and 
uncertainty generally increase transaction 
costs (Ménard, 2008). Yang et al. (2012) 
divide the uncertainty attribute further into 
performance ambiguity and environmental 
risk. Environmental risk pertains to 
technological, behavioral and market risk 
(Yang et al., 2012). Whereas performance 
ambiguity relates to the difficulty of 
measuring a partners performance (Yang et 
al., 2012). Furthermore, Yang et al. (2012) 
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Arora and Fosfuri (2003) argue that small 
companies will find it more beneficial to 
license out, than do large companies. This 
is due to the stronger position of larger 
companies and the risk of losing competitive 
power through licensing. However they 
also found that, when smaller rivals do 
license out in a particular industry, larger 
companies tend to license out more as well. 
In general, Individual firms can find it 
profitable to license out patents when 
competitors have substituting technologies. 
A goal can be, for example, to set a 
technology standard. By doing this, their 
profit may decrease due to increased 
competition by licensees. But, when the 
revenue effect, which is the increased 
turnover, outweighs the rent dissipation 
effect, the decrease in turnover by 
increased competition, then a firm will find 
it profitable to license out (Arora and 
Fosfuri, 2003). However, when products are 
highly differentiated, it becomes less 
attractive to license out. Then, rent 
dissipation, due to stronger competition 
from the licensee relative to other 
competitors of the licensor, outweighs the 
revenue effect (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003).
Transaction costs
“Transaction costs can be defined as the 
costs incurred in coordinating and 
connecting all parts in the production 
chain.” (Den Butter, 2012, p. 49) These 
transaction costs can occur within the 
company through the hierarchy, called 
vertical transaction costs, or between 
companies via market mechanisms, called 
horizontal transaction costs (Den Butter, 
2012).
A method to keep transaction costs low  
is the use of hybrid organizational forms 
(Den Butter, 2012). In hybrid organizations, 
transactions not only take place through 
the market, nor solely through hierarchy, 
but are performed using both methods 
(Douma and Schreuder, 2013). Moreover, 
within hybrids, property rights are distinct, 
but decisions are made jointly (Ménard, 
2008). Furthermore, firms within a hybrid 
are separate legal entities, but have set up 
a governance system to coordinate 
transactions within the hybrid (Ménard, 
2008).
Licensing is a form of hybrid organization. 
The licensor and the licensee are distinct 
legal entities. In addition, transactions 
through licensing are partly achieved 
through the market and partly through 
mutual decision making. Namely, the 
transfer of the right to use the licenser’s 
property rights is done through exchange, 
but certain rules are attached. That is, the 
ownership stays with the licenser and the 
licensee can only use it when it complies 
with certain mutually agreed upon rules. 
These rules can for example stipulate 
during what term the license may be used 
and in what region.
Therefore, when licensing is a hybrid form 
of organization and hybrids are used to 
minimize transaction costs, it is important 
to know what the effect of licensing is on 
transaction costs. Yang et al. (2012)  
provide a framework that links transaction 
attributes and environmental conditions to 
government structures and consequentially 
determine transaction costs and 
effectiveness (Figure 1). It states that 
transaction attributes, environmental 
conditions, institutional arrangement and 
governance structure should all be aligned 
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Figure 1. TCE Framework (Yang et al., 2012)
Transaction Attributes &
Environmental Conditions
•  Asset specificity, performance 
ambiguity, environmental risk, 
transaction frequency
•  Institutional Arrangement 
(Market, Hierarchy, Hybrid)
•  Governance Mechanism 
(Contractual terms &  
Relational adaptation
Transaction
Cost &
Effectiveness
to bounded rationality. These two 
governance mechanisms do not substitute 
each other, but are complements (Yang et 
al., 2012).
 Transaction attributes and environmental 
conditions applied to licensing
The framework form Yang et al. (2012) 
argues that the choice of institutional 
arrangement should be adapted to the 
transaction attributes. In the following,  
I argue that the choice for licensing as an 
institutional arrangement also effects the 
transaction attributes. This in effect 
influences the transaction costs. Furthermore, 
I elaborate on what environmental risks 
would make licensing a good choice to 
lower transaction costs. I do this by 
elaborating on the licensing of patents.
When a company has an invention that is 
new, industrially applicable and non-
obvious, it can file for a patent right 
(Jansen, 2013). This prevents other 
companies from selling the same product 
and thus safeguards the invention. When 
the patent is in place, the company can 
capitalize on the invention by either using  
it in products they sell or by licensing out 
the patent, so other companies can make 
products with it. 
7.1 Asset specificity
The licensing of patents could possibly 
involve more transaction specific 
investments than the selling of goods 
during the negotiation phase. This is due  
to the increased risk of not allowed use  
of knowledge owned by the licensor. This 
could especially be relevant for high tech 
products. When a company sells such a 
product, it sells a tangible item that does 
not directly reveal how it is made.  
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argue that newness of technology has a 
positive effect on performance ambiguity.
Institutional Arrangements 
Institutional arrangement refers to what 
degree business processes in the supply 
chain are carried out within a company  
or between companies (Yang et al., 2012). 
When these processes occur within a 
company, they are coordinated via the 
hierarchy (Yang et al., 2012). In 
organizational hierarchies, higher level 
employees set or ratify objectives and 
policies for lower level employees. These 
lower level employees then carry out the 
actions to comply with these policies and 
attain the corresponding goals. In turn,  
the higher level employees are responsible 
for making sure the lower level employees 
perform these actions adequately (Ouchi, 
1978). On the other hand, when supply 
chain processes are divided between 
different companies, the transfer takes 
place via the market (Yang et al., 2012). 
For example, a car manufacturer can 
decide to make its own wheels. Then 
certain employees will be appointed to 
perform the actions necessary to produce 
these wheels. The coordination is then 
done via the hierarchy. However, when the 
car manufacturer decides to purchase these 
wheels from an outside vendor, it uses the 
market. And coordination is done through 
communication with the vendor via prices, 
technical requirements and contracts.
A middle ground between hierarchy and 
market is a hybrid. Hybrids do not solely 
coordinate tasks via the hierarchy nor do 
they via the market. They perform certain 
tasks via the hierarchy and others via the 
market. The degree to what is coordinated 
through the hierarchy and what is 
coordinated through the market is not set, 
but can vary between cases. Therefore 
hybrids are placed on a continuum 
between Hierarchy and market (Ménard, 
2008).
Governance mechanisms
Governance mechanisms can be divided in 
two categories, namely contractual terms 
and relational adaptation (Yang et al., 
2012). Contractual governance is a more 
formal form of governance involving the 
use of contracts. By using contractual 
governance, parties determine ex-ante 
rules to minimize opportunism (Yang et al., 
2012). Still, opportunistic behavior can 
occur when one party displays behavior 
that is not in line with the expectations of 
the other party, but does conform to the 
explicit agreements in the contract (Muris, 
1981). This is possible because of the 
bounded rationality of the parties. They are 
not able to foresee all of the circumstances 
that might occur after the agreement. 
Therefore they cannot anticipate the other 
party’s behavior as a response to these 
circumstances and thus cannot include 
terms in the contract that align that party’s 
behavioral response with the intentions that 
gave rise to the contract in the first place. 
This is where relational adaptation comes 
into play. Relational adaptation is described 
by Yang et al. (2012) as informal buyer-
supplier cooperation mechanisms. 
Examples are jointly solving problems, the 
sharing of information and buyer supplier 
collaboration (Yang et al., 2012). These 
governance mechanisms are in affect after 
the initial agreement has been made. This 
way they serve as a way to solve some of 
the problems that were not foreseen due 
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However, when it licenses patents, they 
essentially hand over the insights into how 
to make the product. Off course this is 
exactly what a license is for. However to  
be able to sell the innovation to multiple 
licensees it is important for the licensor to 
set rules as to in what region and for what 
period the innovation can be used by the 
licensee, so he can license to other 
licensees as well. Investments made to 
establish these rules are not necessarily 
readily transferable to other transactions. 
Therefore they add to the asset specificity 
of this type of transaction and thus increase 
transaction costs. 
What is more, is that the possibility of not 
foreseeing all the contingencies beforehand 
due to bounded rationality gives rise to 
opportunities for the licensee to display 
hold-up behavior. This hold-up behavior 
further increases transaction costs. 
However, licensing could also decrease 
asset specificity. This is due to the fact that 
a licensing offering is less customized to 
the needs of the end customer than a 
product offering. When deciding on the 
features of a product, the producer has to 
estimate what the needs of the clients are. 
Consequently, it has to make investments 
to be able to incorporate these features 
into the product. When the needs 
assessment is not accurate, the demand  
for the product will drop. When this 
happens, the investments to determine  
the needs and the subsequent investments 
to make the product according to these 
needs will not create the calculated rents. 
When these investments are not readily 
transferable to other products and thus 
transactions, these will be lost. This is less 
of a problem for licensing. Because the 
licensing offering is applicable to more 
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places a burden on the licensor to provide 
evidence to the licensee of the offering. 
Consequently adding to the transaction 
costs for the licensor. 
For example, when a company wants to 
buy a machine to make computer chips,  
the procurement team only needs to know 
the specifications and they know which 
machine is suitable for the task. However, 
when that company is developing such a 
machine itself the engineers might have an 
idea as to what kind of technologies are 
needed in order to make the machine,  
but do not know what these technology 
exactly entail (because if they would, they 
would not need to license them from a 
vendor). Furthermore, in the development 
of the machine, different innovations need 
to be combined. It is uncertain if the 
different licensed technologies are 
combinable. Because of this ambiguity,  
the licensor needs to convince the licensee 
to the usefulness of its innovation. This 
requires extra investments and thus extra 
transaction costs.
Another way in which performance 
ambiguity is affected by licensing, is by  
the difficulty that exists for the licensor to 
measure the compliance of the licensee 
with the established rules of the licensing 
agreement. The only way in which a buying 
firm of goods can chose not to comply with 
agreements is by not paying. In contrast,  
a licensee has multiple options not to 
comply. For example, it can chose to use 
the patent outside of the agreed upon 
geographical area. Or it can chose to use 
the patent for a longer period of time than 
was agreed upon. It is difficult for the 
licensor to detect these sorts of behavior, 
because it would have to monitor all its 
licensee’s products.
products, it is less narrowly defined to end-
customer needs. Therefore, less transaction 
specific investments should be needed. An 
extra advantage in this sense is the time 
and effort that is saved due to the fact that 
a licensor does not have to design and 
produce products. In this time the licenser 
can work on other innovations and thus 
increase its portfolio. When it diversifies its 
innovations sufficiently it has more chances 
of making an innovation that is high in 
demand. 
7.2  Performance ambiguity and newness  
of technology 
Yang et al. (2012) found that newness  
of technology had a positive effect on 
performance ambiguity. One could argue 
that the most interesting time to license 
patents is when they have just been filed 
and thus when the underlying invention  
is new. This is because, when the invention 
is new, all possibilities to apply the 
invention are still new and have not been 
yet been exploited. Because the underlying 
technology is so new, it is difficult for the 
licensee to determine beforehand if it will 
truly reap the calculated benefits from it. 
But not only when the underlying invention 
of the patent is new, will there be ambiguity 
to its usefulness, this is also true when the 
patent has been around for longer. This is 
because in contrast to buying products,  
the licensing of a patent requires the 
subsequent application of this patent.  
Since the patent will be used in the 
production of a new product it is not ex-
ante necessarily certain whether the patent 
will have the expected effect on the 
development of the product. These two 
factors combined make it difficult for the 
licensee to determine ex-ante whether the 
licensor will fulfill his needs. This in turn 
7.3 Environmental risk
According to Noordewier et al. (1990, p. 
83) “Environmental uncertainty is defined 
as unanticipated changes in circumstances 
surrounding an exchange”. Furthermore, 
environmental risk is subdivided between 
technological, behavioral and market risk 
(Yang et al., 2012). It depends on the 
degree of these risks, which institutional 
form minimizes transaction costs (Yang et 
al., 2012). In this section I will try to find 
environmental conditions that call for the 
institutional form of licensing to minimize 
transaction costs. 
One such environmental condition is when 
there is a rapid succession of technologies. 
This would be categorized as high 
technological risk. This leads to a risk of 
investing in technologies that might 
become obsolete before the investments  
in them have paid off. A company can try  
to mitigate this risk by choosing to license 
their inventions instead of developing 
products. By doing so, they can bring the 
technology to the market earlier than when 
they would need time to produce products 
with them. Another advantage is that by 
licensing out the technology, the innovating 
company can enlarge the footprint of this 
technology in the market. Consequently, 
increasing the chances of becoming the 
dominant technology (Arora and Fosfuri, 
2003). 
Contrastingly, when behavioral risk is high, 
licensing is not the preferred institutional 
form. As mentioned before, it is generally 
difficult for a licensor to measure the 
compliance of the licensee with agreements. 
Therefore when a licensee has a tendency 
to display non-complying behavior, 
licensing increases transaction costs.
Market risk is conceptualized by Yang et al. 
(2012) as the chance that the purchased 
item does not satisfy the needs of the 
buyer. Thus when it is hard to read a 
market, and thus to determine what the 
needs of the customers in that market are, 
there is a high market risk. Licensing can 
somewhat lower the market risk, because 
the underlying patent of the license is 
deployable in multiple end products. 
Therefore the needs can be less narrowly 
defined.
8.  Governance mechanisms applied  
to licensing
In order to keep transaction costs as low  
as possible, the governance mechanisms 
should be adapted to the transaction 
attributes and the institutional form. 
Consequently the degree of contractual 
terms as well as the degree of relational 
adaptation mechanisms should be 
optimized.
8.1 Contractual terms
As mentioned before, contractual governance 
mechanisms entail the use of contracts to 
safeguard opportunistic behavior (Yang et al., 
2012). Because performance ambiguity for 
licensing is generally high, contractual 
governance mechanisms play an important 
role to protect the licensor from opportunistic 
behavior form the licensee. These contracts 
should be as specific as possible and should 
take into account all future contingencies 
known ex ante the transaction. This then 
could minimize the opportunistic behavior of 
the licensee. This then results in lower 
transaction costs.
8.2 Relational adaptation
Licensing transactions are more complex 
than goods transactions in the sense that 
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labor and production forces, but a lack  
of knowledge. These countries, however, 
could lack the institutional infrastructure 
needed to safeguard intellectual property 
rights. Especially the BRIC countries are 
interesting for the aforementioned reason 
to license in, but none of these countries 
has fully developed intellectual property 
rights or enforcement mechanisms (Bird, 
2006). Therefore, a company considering  
to license in such a country should ask  
itself whether its knowledge would be 
easily attained an applied by its licensee, 
rendering the licensor useless. If this is  
not the case, than licensing could proof  
to be a durable choice. A second question 
a company should ask itself is whether  
its competitive advantage lies in the 
knowledge they possess. Because when 
there are other companies that are better 
at innovating, it makes no sense for a 
company to try to compete on the basis of 
knowledge. If, however their competitive 
advantage lies in their knowledge, they 
should ask themselves whether they have 
the ability to transfer this knowledge into a 
license. Being able to innovate is one thing, 
but to successfully transfer this knowledge 
is a different capability. Especially since 
knowledge is an intangible resource that 
needs to be codified before it can be 
transferred. It is thus a combination of the 
environment and the capabilities of the firm 
that determine whether licensing is a viable 
choice.
10. Conclusion
This paper discusses the relationship 
between licensing and transaction costs. 
Licensing makes use of intellectual property 
rights to transfer knowledge gained from 
innovations to a licensee in return for a 
monetary fee. These property rights are 
with licensing, knowledge is transferred. 
This knowledge is derived from the 
licensors innovation. To be able to transfer 
this knowledge it should be codified 
(Teece, 1988). For example in descriptions, 
designs, blueprints or other means. These 
codified artifacts differ in their degree of 
accuracy. Adding to that, not all of the 
knowledge of an innovation can be 
codified. This knowledge remains in the 
heads of the innovators themselves. These 
factors combined hamper the successful 
transfer. This could result in the licensee’s 
perceived non-performance by the licensor. 
This leads to increased licensee transaction 
costs due to the non-realization of 
expected rents from the innovation. In turn, 
this dissatisfaction of the licensee reduces 
return business for the licensor. To counter 
these effects, relational adaptation 
mechanisms should be in place. When the 
licensee is experiencing problems 
implementing the knowledge, due to 
inaccurate or incomplete codification, the 
licensor should offer to jointly solve these 
problems. This can be done by actively 
sharing information over time and involving 
the employees that themselves were active 
in the innovation process.
9. When should licensing be applied
Taking these findings into consideration,  
it is interesting to look at circumstances in 
which it is beneficial for a company to 
choose to license. Due to the high 
performance ambiguity, licensing should 
best be applied in countries where there 
are institutions that safeguard intellectual 
property rights and legal measures are 
available to enforce licensing agreements. 
However, licensing could especially be an 
interesting choice in upcoming markets 
where there is ample amount of cheap 
essential in that they protect the innovator 
against copiers. It also provides a means to 
define what it is that they are licensing. 
Transaction costs are the costs incurred in 
coordinating and connecting all the part in 
the production chain (Den Butter, 2012). 
This paper uses the transaction cost 
framework developed by Yang et al. (2012) 
when trying to connect transaction costs to 
licensing. This framework states that 
transaction attributes, institutional form and 
governance structures should be aligned to 
minimize transaction costs. While applying 
this framework, it is argued that licensing 
can increase asset specificity because of the 
extra incurred costs of defining rules for use 
for the licensed innovation. On the other 
hand it could also decrease asset specificity, 
because of the decreased need of 
estimating customers’ demand. Therefore, 
performance ambiguity for licensing is 
relatively high. This is due to increased 
difficulty of measuring compliance by the 
licensee and the extra effort the licensor 
has to make to convey the value of the 
innovation. Furthermore, licensing can 
offset some of the higher transaction costs 
involved with high technological risk and 
high market risk. And that when behavioral 
risk is high, that licensing increases 
transaction costs. Moreover, it seems that 
contractual governance mechanisms are of 
increased importance, because of the 
higher performance ambiguity related with 
licensing. And that relational adaptation is 
important as well to keep transaction costs, 
involved with licensing, low as well. It is 
argued that the question whether a 
company should license is determined both 
by the environment as well as the 
capabilities of the company.
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Introduction
Companies from small domestic markets 
often seek to expand their revenue by 
internationalizing (Johanson and 
Wiedersheim, 1975). Companies begin  
to internationalize when they are still 
comparatively small and gradually increase 
their development abroad. Companies 
choose to either expand to other small 
foreign markets or they choose to 
internationalize into relatively large  
foreign markets. A firm’s decision to go 
abroad is concerned not only about what 
markets to enter but also about how to 
enter them (Lee and Lieberman, 2010).  
A firms choice of the mode of entry into  
a foreign market is one the most important 
strategic decisions made by companies 
(Shane, 1994). It is difficult to change to 
another entry mode, when one has already 
invested a lot and has to abide to certain 
long-term contracts.
The amount of control the firm will have 
over its foreign business activities will be 
determined by the choice of entry mode 
(Erramilli and Rao, 1993). An entry mode 
can be defined as “a structural agreement 
that allows a firm to implement its product 
market strategy in a host country either by 
carrying out only the marketing operations 
(i.e., via export modes), or both production 
and marketing operations there by itself or 
in partnership with others (contractual 
modes, joint ventures, wholly owned 
operations)” (Sharma and Erramilli, 2004).
There has been a lot of research to the 
entry mode choices and internationalization 
of firms. The dominant theory in foreign 
market entry choice is the Transaction Cost 
Economics framework (TCE) (Taylor et al., 
1988). The TCE perspective views the entry 
mode choice as a critical decision of 
governance. Resting on the interplay of two 
key assumptions of bounded rationality and 
opportunism and the three key dimensions 
of transaction (i.e., asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and frequency), TCE advocates 
a governance form that can minimize the 
costs associated with governing and 
monitoring transactions (Williamson, 1979, 
1981, 1987, 1999).
Although, there has been a considerable 
amount of research on the topic of foreign 
market entry and transaction cost, this 
paper differs in the following way from 
previous research. Whereas previous 
research was predominately focused on 
manufacturing firms, this paper focuses on 
service firms. Furthermore, in contrast to 
previous research, this paper discusses a 
case study of an international company and 
aims to provide insights relevant to the 
practical application of TCE in strategic 
management. The research question is  
how companies use the TCE framework 
when deciding on the mode of entry 
choice. The evidence of this paper stems 
from an in depth interview with a 
multinational in the relocation industry. 
Particular interest is given to the question 
whether TCE can explain the choice of 
entry made by this service company. 
The rest of the paper is structured as 
follows: Section 2 describes the Transaction 
Cost Economics framework, with specific 
attention on service firms. Section 3 
introduces the company of the case study. 
Moreover this section explains the 
relevance of transaction cost for this firm. 
Section 4 gives an overview of how the 
company manages its transaction cost in 
the international business environment. 
Section 5 concludes with our main findings.
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Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)
The Transaction cost approach to the  
study of economic organization regards  
the transaction as the basic unit of analysis 
and holds that an understanding of 
transaction cost economizing is central  
to the study of organizations (Commons 
1931). Transaction cost economics where 
used by Coase (1937) to explain when it  
is better to use the market or the internal 
hierarchy. Oliver Williamson (1979) further 
developed this framework and proposed 
several determinants of transactions cost. 
The Determinants of transaction cost
Two of the main sources of transaction cost 
are bounded rationality and opportunistic 
behaviour. Both are two behavioural 
assumptions made in TCE that differ from 
the neoclassical microeconomics. Firstly, 
TCE assumes that human individuals are 
subject to bounded rationality. Individuals 
with bounded rationality experience limits 
in formulating and solving complex 
problem, as well with the processing of 
information (Simon, 1978). Because 
individuals are subject to bounded 
rationality, it is impossible to specify 
complete contracts in all relevant aspects. 
Secondly, TCE assumes that the risk  
of opportunism is present in many 
transactions. Opportunism defined by 
Williamson (1995) as “self interest seeking 
with guile”. If individuals would not behave 
opportunistic, that is they would not show 
self-interest seeking behaviour, it would be 
no problem to have incomplete contracts. 
However, because individuals can show 
opportunistic behaviour, incomplete 
contracts can be a source of risk and cost. 
Without opportunism it would not be 
necessary to set up contracts for a 
transaction, a promise by the other party 
would suffice. Without opportunism, the 
economic rationale for coordinating an 
exchange within a hierarchy would be 
substantially reduced (Hill, 1990). 
The third major source of transaction cost 
Riordan and Williamson (1985) distinguish  
is asset specificity, which depends on the 
characteristics of the good or service. Asset 
specificity has to do with how specialized 
the investment made for this transaction is. 
Specific assets are investments made that 
have little value outside the specific 
transactional relationship (Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1991). There are 
three kinds of asset specificity: Site 
specificity, physical specificity and human 
assets specificity. These factors are all 
important, because the investments lock 
the supplier as well as the buyer in a 
bilateral exchange relation for a 
considerable period thereafter. The buyer 
and seller cannot turn to alternative sources 
because of the specificity of the 
investments, it will be more expensive from 
an unspecialized supplier. 
The last two sources of transaction cost, 
which result from the characteristics of the 
transactions are: frequency and uncertainty. 
The more frequent a company has 
transactions in a market, the higher the 
transaction cost of renegotiating a contract 
will be (Klein et al., 1990, p. 197). The 
uncertainty of the transaction can play a 
role in the opportunistic behaviour of the 
transaction partners. 
TCE and entry mode choice
Firms will attempt to minimize the combined 
cost of entering contractual arrangement 
and running and monitoring the system 
(Buckley and Casson, 1976). According to 
TCE, firms will choose their government 
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structure such that the transaction cost will 
be the lowest in the chosen structure. If 
transaction costs are low, a rational firm  
will prefer its transactions to be governed 
by the market. However, if the costs of 
adaptation, performance monitoring, and 
safe- guarding against opportunistic 
behaviour are too high, the firm will prefer 
an internal governance structure such as a 
wholly owned subsidiary or a dominant 
joint venture (Hill and Kim, 1988; Madhok, 
1997). 
Market attractiveness
There have been many authors that have 
researched the relation between TCE and 
entry mode choice. According to Taylor et 
al. (1988) market attractiveness is one of 
the most important factors. Depending on 
the market attractiveness, firms will choose 
a low control entry mode when the market 
attractiveness is low and a high control 
mode when the market attractiveness is 
high. When the market is already fairly 
saturated, market prices are, most of the 
time, very competitive. It is therefore 
probably better to choose the market over 
the internal hierarchy. In a market with 
many competing firms, profitability is often 
low and therefore does not justify large 
resource commitment and investments that 
are needed by high control modes (Kim 
and Hwang, 1992). In a perfectly 
competitive market, market specialists will 
perform efficiently, and thus keep 
transaction costs low. By allowing 
specialists to perform some of its functions, 
the firm can avoid some of the disabling 
forces associated with building intra-firm 
bureaucracies. Therefore, the firm is better 
off using a market governance structure for 
its transactions (Zhao et al., 2004). 
TCE suggests that when the chance of free 
riding is high, it is more efficient to choose 
a high control entry mode (Anderson and 
Gatignon, 1986). When the uncertainty of 
demand is large in the foreign market, firms 
prefer a high control (Williamson, 1975). 
High external uncertainty makes it very 
expensive to write and enforce contracts 
that specify uncertainty (Taylor et al., 1988). 
Erramilli and Rao (1993) found that that 
cultural similarity of the home country and 
the host country lead to lower transaction 
cost. There is a negative relation between 
the cultural similarity of the home country 
and the host country and a firm’s choice of 
high control entry mode. Cultural 
dissimilarity leads to increased information 
asymmetry and consequently to high 
monitor cost for the home country 
(Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996). Working 
with a different corporate culture of a 
foreign partner will lead to an increased 
complexity (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007). 
Wholly owned subsidiary could be used to 
avoid this complexity (Morschett et al., 
2010). 
Another important factor in deciding 
between entry modes is the foreign 
countries openness to foreign investment. 
There is a positive relation between the 
openness to foreign investments and the 
choice for high control entry modes 
(Contractor and Kundu, 1998).
Service firms vs. manufacturing firms
All of the factors decribed above have been 
extensively tested in the TCE literature. 
However, this was tested predominately 
with non-service firms. There has not been 
much research to the application of TCE in 
service firms. The few studies that have 
been conducted on service firms seem to 
conflict (Morschett et al., 2010). 
The following paragraph reviews the 
findings of the few studies that did focus on 
service firms. 
Service Firms
The most important differences when 
compared with production firms, is that 
service firms produce something intangible. 
Production and consumption happen at  
the same time. Therefore it is reasonable  
to assume that firms prefer to use high 
control entry modes when entering  
foreign markets. This way, firms have more 
control over the quality of the service. If 
manufacturing firms use a foreign partner 
firm in entering a foreign market, they can 
more easily control the quality of the 
products their partner firms is going to sell, 
because production and consumption are 
not simultaneous with manufacturing firms. 
Furthermore because of the heterogeneous 
character of services, using a partner firm 
can lead to more volatility in the quality of 
the service then when a firms uses more 
high control entry modes when entering 
foreign markets.
Asset specificity and service firms
Research suggests that service firms vary 
with respect to the asset specificity of their 
service; these variations may result in 
differences in mode selection (Contractor 
and Kundu, 1998; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; 
Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque, 1995; 
Murray and Kotabe, 1999). Service firms 
have high asset specificity, in particular high 
human asset specificity. Service Firms invest 
a lot in the training and knowledge of 
employees (Brouthers, 2003). Service firms 
prefer WHOS, because of their high asset 
specificity. 
Environmental uncertainty and service firms
Services have the characteristics that  
they are produced and consumed at the 
same time. The firm needs to be present  
at the moment the service is consumed. 
Services are therefore people intense. 
These attributes suggest that service firms 
require greater control in order to deal with 
changes in the environment (Bowen and 
Jones, 1986; Habib and Victor, 1991). 
When there are changes in the environment, 
contractual agreements (such as joint 
venture agreements) may need to be 
renegotiated and changed (Williamson, 
1991). This requires time that the service 
firm may not have, and reduces flexibility 
needed to address environmental 
uncertainties in a timely fashion (Erramilli 
and Rao, 1993). This literature thus 
suggests that service firms will choose high 
control entry mode such as WHOS, when 
faced with environmental uncertainty. 
However, other studies have found mixed 
results with respect to this claim (Fladmoe-
Lindquist and Jacque, 1995).
Behavioural uncertainty and services
Behavioural uncertainty about the 
behaviour of partners in foreign markets, 
because of opportunism and bounded 
rationality, may result in high control and 
monitor cost of partner firms (Hill, 1990). 
TCE theory suggests that if behavioural 
uncertainty increases, firms will choose  
high control entry modes such as WHOS 
(Chiles and McMackin, 1996). In an  
internal structure firms can control the 
behaviour of their employees more 
efficiently (Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque, 
1995). Because services are people 
intensive, culture may have a larger 
influence on service firms then on 
manufacturing firms. It is not clear in the 
literature, whether culture increases the 
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need for high control entry modes or for 
low control entry modes.
Case study of Corstjens Relocation Group
In order to analyse the use of TCE on a 
practical level, this study investigates how 
an entrepreneur uses the TCE framework in 
his/her strategic decision-making at a micro 
level. This type of data collecting arguably 
provides the most interesting and practical 
research directions for future research. 
Moreover, this case study gives an insight 
in the entry mode decisions of service firms, 
an area of TCE entry mode decision theory 
that is not yet well researched (Morschett 
et al., 2010).
The following three firm structures are 
investigated in order from low to high 
control entry mode: strategic alliance, 
franchise, wholly owned subsidiary. It is 
assumed that low control entry modes will 
be the standard entry mode. However, we 
assume that if the transaction costs may 
influence a company to choose a more  
high control entry mode such as a franchise 
or a wholly owned subsidiary or choose to 
use the market. 
For this case study the company Corstjens 
Relocations Group in Amsterdam has  
been analysed. The company was founded 
in 1946. It is one of the largest Relocation 
companies in Eastern Europe. Its activities 
include the relocation of people to a 
different country (collecting, transporting 
and delivering the household goods to 
their new destination). But also 
complementary activities as house and 
school search, legal documents 
acquirement, and custom services. The 
company has a global workforce of 320 
employees of which 30 employees work at 
the headquarters in Amsterdam, whereas 
the rest of the work force works at various 
destinations in Europa and Asia. The 
clientele consist largely of multinationals, 
governmental and non-governmental 
organisations. 
The company started to internationalize in 
the 1985. The first foreign office was in 
Belgrade. The main clients in this location 
were embassy employees. In the next years 
Corstjens got the contracts with the 
American embassy for various destinations 
in Eastern Europe. Soon after Corstjens got 
the contract for the embassy of the United 
Kingdom for all UK embassies in Easter 
Europe. After the perestroika multinationals 
started to locate in Eastern Europe and 
Corstjens begin to work for multinational 
firms. Internationalization is a necessary 
aspect in the relocation industry. The Dutch 
domestic market is very small for relocation 
companies, people generally change places 
within the Netherlands. They move to 
places not too far from their original location. 
Often people do not use professional firms 
to facilitate the relocation, but instead 
relocate themselves. In order to increase 
their revenue and profits, companies will 
need to internationalize. Consider this 
when a relocation firm has an office in 
Amsterdam and is now going to open a 
location in Brussels. One has not only the 
ability to relocate clients from the 
Netherlands to Belgium and vice versa,  
but one will also get orders from 
companies in other countries (who have  
no office in Belgium) to perform the 
Belgium part of their relocation. Expanding 
your operational network to foreign 
countries can thus be very rewarding in 
terms of revenue and profits. However, it is 
not necessary for companies to be 
physically present in foreign countries. 
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Data collection 
For this paper, the goal is to analyse the 
role of transaction costs on a micro 
perspective in order to find out what the 
practical relevance of transaction cost on 
strategic management is. In particular, 
companies often face on a daily basis the 
make or buy decision. To research this it is 
important to have access to the executive 
level, i.e. the level where the make or buy 
decisions are made. Furthermore it is 
important to have profound knowledge  
of the industry in order to ask the most 
relevant questions. The company I chose  
to analyse in this paper is Corstjens 
Relocation Group. This is a family company 
founded by my grandfather. I have worked 
extensively in this company at the 
Headquarters and the Russian Branch.  
By working I was witness of the many 
decisions that have to be made with 
regards to the make or buy decision. This  
is not a one-time decision, rather it is a 
decision that is made on a continuous basis. 
The interview for this paper is conducted 
with the CEO and the COO of the 
company. 
The interview process was structured as 
follows. Firstly, the questions were asked, 
why Corstjens wants to internationalize. 
Thereafter, a list was made of the countries 
where the company conducted most of  
its transactions. This list consists of 36 
countries. We then proceeded by sorting 
the countries in categories of entry mode. 
This led to the scheme in Table 1. The 
remaining part of the interview was spent 
on the explanation of the scheme. The 
questions asked during the interview were 
about the following topics:
As mentioned earlier, there are also foreign 
firms that are not present in the domestic 
market of the other firm. The domestic firm 
can perform the part of the relocation in 
their home country and the foreign firm will 
take over the relocation in their domestic 
market. 
Corstjens thus has several options for 
conducting business in other countries.  
It can choose to use the market in the 
foreign country when they have to do a 
relocation, but they can also choose to go 
for a more high control entry mode such  
as franchising and establishing there own 
location in the foreign market (WHOS).  
The motive for internationalization is thus 
to increase the operational network and 
thereby also the revenue and profits. 
Increasing the international operational 
network lead to lower “hard” transaction 
cost such as transport cost. Furthermore,  
in the current time and age, multinationals 
usually write one tender offer for multiple 
destinations. Relocation firms will only have 
a chance to win this contract if they are 
present in all the destinations by WHOS, 
joint ventures or franchise. It is also  
possible to win the contract if the company 
makes use of a strategic alliance in some of 
the destinations. However, multinationals 
have a strong preference for firms with  
own locations in all the destinations 
specified in the contract. Because in this 
way multinationals have to deal with only 
one relocation company for all of their 
destinations. This is a reduction in 
transaction costs for the multinationals. 
Having you own locations in foreign 
markets can result in the acquiring of very 
large global contracts. 
1. Reason for internationalization 
2.  Explanation of choice for specific entry 
mode
3.  Benefits achieved in the current entry 
mode choice
4.  What frictions exist in the current entry 
mode choices
5.  What factors could lead to a change in 
this scheme
The interview led to some interesting 
findings. First of all, the relevance of 
industry specific factor with regards to the 
make or buy decisions became immediately 
clear. In contrast to the current literature on 
transaction cost, were researchers are 
predominately concerned with the one on 
one relations of certain transaction cost 
factors and their influence on the make or 
buy decisions. Researchers often do not 
consider industry specific characteristics. 
Moreover even the distinction between 
manufacturing and service is not 
considered in most studies. In the next 
section I will explain the importance of the 
industry specific factors on the make or buy 
decision. 
Managing transaction cost 
As is noted in the literature 
internationalization can result in an increase 
of the revenue and profits of a firm. The 
entry mode literature is very extensive. 
There is however a considerable amount of 
studies that conflict each other. 
Furthermore, most of the studies 
conducted on this subject, only researched 
manufacturing companies. The interview 
provides some interesting findings. The 
most relevant information is described in 
the next subsection.
Operational network
Corstjens strongly prefers to use foreign 
market entries such as Franchises and 
WHOS. A large reduction in transaction 
cost comes from increasing their 
operational network. The more physical 
locations Corstjens has in Eastern Europe, 
the lower the transport cost will be. 
Moreover, the revenue increases much 
more when using a WHOS or franchise as 
entry mode versus a Strategic alliance of 
Market transaction, because of the increase 
in additional destinations of the network. 
Market
Brazil
Argentina
Spain
Portugal
Sweden
Finland
Denmark
Italy
Germany
Strategic Alliance
USA
United Kingdom
France
Switzerland
Korea
China
India
Japan
Singapore/Dubai
Table 1
Entry mode of Corstjens in various countries
Franchise
Bulgaria
Serbia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Estonia
Lithuania
Belarus
Sakhalin’s Islands
Wholly owned subsidiary
Russia
Ukraine
Latvia
Poland
Czech Republic
Hungary
Romania
Croatia
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Consider the following examples.
Standard situation 1
No Internationalization.
In this situation the company is only active  
on the domestic market and does not deal  
with international transactions. 
Situation 2
With internationalization via market of strategic alliance.
In this situation the company internationalizes via market or strategic alliances. By doing 
this Corstjens will perform relocations from Netherlands to foreign destinations and vice 
versa. The way this works in practice when someone is moving from the Netherlands to 
the USA, is that Corstjens will perform the part of the relocation in the Netherlands and a 
partner company in the USA, will do the USA part of the relocation. So the revenue of 
Corstjens, gained from the domestic market, will be complemented with the revenue 
Corstjens gains from preforming the domestic part of international relocations. 
Situation 3
Internationalization via WHOS  
or/and Franchise.
Corstjens can also choose to  
internationalize via WHOS and/ or  
franchise. In contrast to the previous  
situation, Corstjens will now perform the  
domestic part of the relocation, as well  
as the foreign part of the relocation. 
Situation 2 and 3 compared
Corstjens strongly prefers to enter  
via situation 3. 
The reason is that, as can be seen  
when one compares situation 2 with 
situation 3, by using situation 3, 
Corstjens gains an additional  
destination, namely Ukraine- Russia  
and Russia-Ukraine. Entering markets  
via WHOS or/and franchise thus opens 
up other destination. Increasing your 
network of WHOS or Franchise adds 
increasingly more destinations as can  
be seen in the model below.
In reality, Corstjens network looks more 
like the scheme below.
The Netherlands
USAUnited Kingdom
The 
Netherlands
RussiaThe Netherlands
Ukraine
Russia
Ukraine
The 
Netherlands
Poland
USA
Russia
Ukraine
The 
Netherlands
Poland
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of law it is necessary for international firms 
to keep, in addition to the regular English 
bookkeeping system, to also keep a 
Russian bookkeeping system. Moreover, 
the accounting rules of the Russian 
bookkeeping system differ significantly 
from the normal international accounting 
standards. The Russian system is based on 
a cash system, revenue is only booked 
when the company receives the revenue on 
its bank account. The creditor/ debtor 
system is none existent. It is very time 
consuming and non efficient to run this 
system. The accounting regulations in 
Russia and Ukraine are major sources of 
transaction cost. Therefore, the lowest 
transaction cost could be attained by using 
the market for transactions in these 
countries. Local companies do not have to 
maintain an international bookkeeping 
system. Hence, these local companies can 
perform the service cheaper, as they only 
have to use one bookkeeping system. 
However, as we will see later, every entry 
mode decision is made by taking in account 
all relevant factors. 
The role of institutions:  
Legal systems and industry associations
The legal system is one of the most 
important institutions in international trade 
that brings about differences in transaction 
costs. International trade is based on 
contracts. It is therefore necessary to have 
a good legal system present in the 
countries were a company is conducting its 
business. In the Ukraine the “legal systems 
is completely corrupt”. A contract in this 
country is not worth much, because the 
judge will not validate your contract. This is 
particular true for foreign companies. The 
transactions cost are too high to conduct 
transaction via any other mode than wholly 
owned subsidiary. Corstjens chose to start 
Furthermore, a network of Franchises and 
WHOS are preferred by large multinationals 
that will only use one company to perform 
their relocations. Multinationals also aim to 
reduce their transaction costs. For 
multinational, using only one company is 
cheaper in terms of transaction costs than 
using a different company for each location. 
Therefore having a large network of own 
destinations can unlock large contracts 
from multinationals, which would be  
unable to be obtained when one would 
internationalize via strategic alliances or  
via the market. It became clear, during the 
interview, that the operational network is 
the most important source of reducing 
transaction costs for this company and 
quite possibly this industry. 
External environment: political aspects,  
legal aspects
Political dynamics can play an important 
role for the entry mode decisions. France 
was one of the largest markets for 
Corstjens. Furthermore, Corstjens used the 
market for relocations. After the 2008 
credit crisis, the volume in France as well  
as the volume from French multinationals  
in other parts of Europe started to decline. 
This was because the French government 
was forcing French multinationals to use 
domestic firms. The partners of Corstjens  
in France did not use Corstjens anymore 
even though reciprocity prescribes this. In 
reaction to these developments Corstjens 
will start a WHOS in France. Because the 
transaction cost will be the lowest with a 
WHOS as it will not suffer from the 
protectionism of France. 
Corstjens endures very large transaction 
costs in Russia and Ukraine. Apart from the 
corruption, the accounting regulation is the 
largest source of transaction costs. By rule 
a wholly owned subsidiary in Ukraine 
because of the legal system inability to 
validate contracts. Even though the 
transaction costs are high because of the 
bookkeeping system, at the end, the legal 
factor weighted more than the 
bookkeeping factor in deciding the entry 
decision. 
Another example of why institutions play a 
large role in transaction costs is the 
presence of industry associations. One of 
the most important institutions for the 
relocation sector is the Fédération 
Internationale des Déménageurs 
Internationaux (FIDI). When relocation firms 
satisfy a list of demanding requirements, it 
is possible for them to become accredited 
and become a member of FIDI. When a 
relocation firm becomes a member of the 
FIDI, it will benefit from several reductions 
in transaction cost. Firstly it will be able to 
use the FIDI member database. This 
reduces all transaction costs associated 
with the search and controlling of firms in 
markets where the company is not really 
familiar. The FIDI certification stands for 
high quality and reliable relocation firms. 
The transaction costs for using the market 
therefore are reduced. Secondly when a 
FIDI member goes bankrupt, the FIDI will 
pay all the money the bankrupting firm 
owed to other FIDI members back. This 
further reduces the search for reputable 
companies and control cost of Corstjens 
when using the market. It is important for 
clients to experience the same kind of 
quality of the relocation service in the 
country of departure and country of arrival. 
Therefore the positive influence the FIDI 
has on this aspect cannot be 
underestimated.
Market attractiveness and frequency  
of transaction
According to Corstjens the most important 
determinants of the foreign entry mode 
decisions are market attractiveness and 
frequency of transaction. It is only after 
analysing these characteristics of the 
foreign market that other determinants are 
considered. For example Brazil is a very 
attractive market with frequent transactions. 
So Corstjens would like to enter this 
market. However, its transaction costs are 
extremely high. There is a lot of corruption; 
it is not uncommon for shipments to be 
held in harbour customs for one month 
before being released after paying waiting 
money for every day it was held in the 
harbour. Furthermore transaction costs 
arise because of the necessity to train 
employees the European business culture. 
Lastly because of its geographical location 
it is costly to monitor and control. Corstjens 
therefore uses the market in Brazil.
Although Russia and the Ukraine are 
extremely risky, the attractiveness of the 
market and the transaction frequency 
ultimately determine the foreign market 
entry. However, other determinants may 
influence in what firm structure Corstjens 
will be present. Because the risk on 
opportunistic behaviour is fairly large, 
Corstjens will choose for a WHOS in 
Ukraine and Russia. Opportunism can often 
be present in Franchises. Corstjens used to 
have a franchise in Macedonia. However, 
the transactions costs became too large for 
Corstjens, because the Franchisee violated 
the Franchise agreements by doing a large 
part of the relocations on his own account. 
Instead of using the Corstjens network. In 
order to keep the lowest transaction cost.  
It is necessary to continue to keep analysing 
the transaction cost in your organization. 
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Conclusion
This paper investigates the influence of 
transaction costs on the entry mode choice 
in foreign markets. In particular, the goal 
was to find an answer to the question: Can 
TCE explain the entry mode decision 
Corstjens made in entering foreign markets? 
The answer to this question is that TCE can 
explain the entry mode choices Corstjens 
made in entering foreign markets. 
However, Corstjens management does not 
explicitly use TCE as a theoretical framework, 
when it decides how to enter foreign 
markets. From the interview it became clear 
that the more formal approach of transaction 
cost management would certainty benefit 
the company in helping decide the foreign 
market entry choice. Moreover, the 
transaction cost framework could be used 
as a tool to monitor environmental changes 
and their effects on transaction cost. In this 
way Corstjens could react to changes in 
transaction cost more in advance then it 
currently does. 
This paper differs from previous research in 
two ways; firstly it investigates the influence 
of transaction costs in service firms. 
Secondly, it analyses the transaction costs 
on a micro perspective. Therefore it could 
analyse the practical influence of transaction 
costs on strategic management. This leads 
to the following three findings: Firstly, the 
importance of industry specific factors is 
the most important factor in explaining 
foreign market entry. During the interview 
it became clear that for Corstjens, 
increasing the operational network brings 
about the greatest reduction in transaction 
cost. Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
assume that in each industry there is an 
industry specific factor that can lead to the 
largest reduction in transaction costs for 
firms in that industry. So this factor should 
Transaction costs are very dynamic. 
Consider the examples of France and 
Macedonia. Markets can change very 
quickly; the same goes for the behaviour of 
franchises. WHOS definitely provide the 
greatest flexibility to react on these 
changes. So there could be a positive 
relation between the uncertainty on a 
market and the choice for WHOS. However 
when the most important determinants of 
transaction cost Market attractiveness and 
Transaction frequency change, it might me 
more appropriate too choose the leanest 
entry mode possible. 
Culture and Foreign entry mode choice
There is no clear consensus in the literature 
of the influence of culture on entry mode 
decisions. According to Corstjens the more 
different both cultures are, the more 
probable it is to use a WHOS as entry 
mode. But in the interview it is again 
stressed that Market attractiveness and 
transaction frequency ultimately determine 
which entry mode will be chosen. 
Moreover: “In a under developed markets, 
it is as western company easy to make a big 
difference”. Normally it is very difficult to 
find a high quality company in an 
underdeveloped market. Multinationals in 
underdeveloped markets will always choose 
to work with foreign relocation firms. In 
developed markets there are already high 
quality companies present, which reduce 
the need for a WHOS. The literature on 
culture in Foreign entry choice might 
conflict each other, because other authors 
perhaps not always consider the significant 
interaction effects between culture and 
market attractiveness and transaction 
frequency. 
be given the most attention when a firm 
decides to enter a foreign market. The 
importance given to the one-on-one 
relations in the current literature of 
transaction costs seems therefore to have 
less practical application in real life. 
Secondly, in deciding how to enter a 
foreign market, the weighting of relevant 
factors is particularly important. The 
interview makes it clear that the particular 
situation in each country is different. Where 
some factors might be very important in 
some countries, in other countries they may 
be not so important. Corstjens gives the 
most weight to the factors Market 
Attractiveness and Transaction Frequency. 
However, these two factors might be the 
same in two countries, but the entry mode 
choice could still be different. The entry 
mode decision is ultimately always decided 
by weighting all factors that lead to the 
entry mode with the lowest transaction 
costs in that particular market. 
Thirdly, transaction costs need to be 
dynamically managed. One needs to 
constantly monitor whether the chosen 
entry mode choice still has the lowest 
transaction costs. If this is not the case, 
then one has to alter its entry mode. This 
will lead the firm to endure the least costs 
in that country. This is explained in this 
paper by the examples of France and 
Macedonia. Because of, in this case political 
or changes in the behaviour of partner 
firms, the situation in these countries 
changed and the chosen entry modes did 
not have the lowest transactions costs 
anymore. This led Corstjens to alter its 
entry mode choice. 
Future research should focus on 
researching the specific industry factors in 
different industries. It is of less practical 
importance to keep focusing on finding 
one-on-one relations of transaction cost 
factors that explain entry mode choices. It 
seems that service firms have a clear 
preference for high control entry modes. 
This relation needs to be further 
researched. Furthermore, firms would 
benefit from the development of a 
transaction cost management framework 
that can provide a more formal approach to 
strategic management in deciding which 
entry mode offers the lowest transaction 
mode. This framework could also be used 
as a tool to monitor transaction costs in a 
dynamic way. 
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5Samenvatting
in het Nederlands 
Transactiemanagement  
tussen markt en hiërarchie
Bij de organisatie van de productie kan  
een onderscheid worden gemaakt tussen 
productie via de markt en via de hiërarchie. 
Transactiekosten zijn bepalend voor de 
keuze tussen beide vormen van organisatie. 
Wanneer de transactiekosten via de markt 
hoger zijn dan via de hiërarchie is het het 
beste om de productie binnen het bedrijf 
te organiseren. Het omgekeerde geldt voor 
een keuze van organisatie via de markt. 
Dit gedachtegoed is ontleend aan het 
baanbrekende werk over het 
producentengedrag van Ronald Coase, 
Nobelprijswinnaar economie in 1991, en in 
2013 op 102-jarige leeftijd overleden. 
Daarbij kan Coase ook als grondlegger 
worden beschouwd van de leer van de 
Nieuwe Institutionele Economie. De keuze 
tussen markt en hiërarchie is echter niet de 
enige die ondernemers kunnen maken bij 
de organisatie van de productie. Vele 
tussenvormen zijn denkbaar, zogenaamde 
hybride organisatievormen. Te denken  
valt aan coöperatieve samenwerkings-
verbanden, allianties, licensering en 
franchising. In het kader van de 
honourscursus aan de Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam “The Economics of 
globalization: A transaction costs 
perspective” van prof. Frank den Butter en 
prof. Henri de Groot is door de studenten 
een aantal zeer goede papers geschreven 
dat raakt aan dit gedachtegoed. Deze 
papers zijn gepresenteerd tijdens een 
workshop in Den Haag waar over de papers 
met een aantal belangstellenden uit de 
wetenschap en de praktijk van gedachten is 
gewisseld. 
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Erik Blokland
Goodwill and
transaction costs
Het paper van Erik Blokland gaat 
over het verband tussen goodwill en 
transactiekosten. Deze relatie is tweeledig. 
Goodwill speelt vooral een rol bij verkoop 
van een bedrijf, of bij de waardering 
van het bedrijf in het geval van fusie 
of overname. In dat geval behoort de 
goodwill tot de transactiekosten bij de 
transactie in geval van verkoop, fusie of 
overname. In de tweede plaats - en dat lijkt 
vanuit het perspectief van de economie 
van de transactiekosten minstens even 
relevant - kan goodwill gezien worden als 
de balanswaardering van de mogelijkheid 
van een bedrijf de productie en omzet te 
organiseren tegen lage transactiekosten. 
In die zin reflecteert de goodwill op de 
balans de investeringen in allerhande 
niet zichtbare activa (“intangible assets”), 
die er toe bijdragen dat het bedrijf een 
concurrentievoordeel heeft en efficiënt zijn 
omzet/winst weet te behalen. Het paper 
kijkt daarbij meer specifiek naar twee 
aspecten uit de praktijk: (i) de waardering 
van de goodwill bij de vier grootste 
Nederlandse banken, en (ii) de waardering 
van de merknaam bij multinationals met 
een sterke merknaam. Zo’n merknaam, en 
de daarbij behorende reputatie is een mooi 
voorbeeld van “onzichtbaar kapitaal” dat 
tot verlaging van transactiekosten leidt. 
Goodwill en waardering van de merknaam 
blijken sterk verwant maar niet identiek. 
Remo Corstjens
TCE and foreign
entry mode of service
firms: a case study in the
international relocation sector
Het paper van Remo Corstjens beschrijft hoe 
transactiekosten een rol spelen bij 
strategische beslissingen van een 
internationaal verhuisbedrijf over de manier 
waarop in het buitenland al dan niet met 
partners zaken wordt gedaan. Er worden vier 
verschillende manieren onderscheiden waarop 
de zaken in het buitenland geregeld worden 
namelijk via de markt, via een strategische 
alliantie, via Franchise en via een eigen 
dochteronderneming. De eerste en laatste 
organisatievormen komen overeen met de 
door Coase onderscheiden archetypen: de 
markt versus de hiërarchie. De beide andere 
manieren van organisatie zijn hybride vormen 
die tussen markt en hiërarchie in liggen. De 
constatering in het paper is dat het 
internationale verhuisbedrijf alle vier de 
vormen al naar gelang de omstandigheden 
benut en op dat punt ook een flexibele en 
dynamische bedrijfsvoering heeft. Veranderde 
omstandigheden kunnen ertoe nopen om de 
organisatievorm aan te passen. Het blijkt dat 
bij deze beslissingen de afweging van de 
verschillende in de theorie onderscheiden 
vormen van transactiekosten een belangrijke 
rol spelen. Maar dat is wel intuïtie: in de 
praktijk wordt niet met transactiekosten 
gerekend. Dit paper verschaft een uitstekend 
voorbeeld van hoe een case studie over 
transactiemanagement er uit kan zien. Uniek 
daarbij is dat het over een bedrijf in de 
zakelijke dienstverlening gaat en niet, zoals 
voorgaande cases over bedrijven uit de 
maakindustrie.
Jeroen de Nie
An enquiry into the
relation between
licensing and
transaction costs
Het paper van Jeroen de Nie beziet het 
verband tussen transactiekosten en 
licensering. Het doen gebruiken van door 
het ene bedrijf ontwikkelde ideeën of 
regels door een ander bedrijf door dit idee 
of de regel in licentie te geven kan als een 
hybride vorm van organisatie tussen markt 
en hiërarchie worden gezien. Het paper 
beschrijft hoe verschillende aspecten uit de 
economische theorie van de 
transactiekosten, zoals “asset specificity” 
en de onzekerheid over instituties en 
snelheid van technologische ontwikkeling, 
een invloed hebben op de strategische 
keuze om tot in licentie geven over te 
gaan. De wijze waarop de contracten van 
het in licentie geven zijn vormgegeven en 
de mate waarin deze handhaafbaar zijn, 
spelen een belangrijke rol bij deze hybride 
vorm van de organisatie van de productie. 
6RITM: Research 
on managing 
transactions costs 
www.feweb.vu.nl/nl/afdelingen-en-instituten/ritm/
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What is RITM?
The Research Institute for Trade and 
Transaction Management (RITM) combines 
academic scientific research and 
commissioned research projects based on 
transaction costs economics. All projects 
have practical relevance for a transaction 
economy like that of the Netherlands.  
RITM is a research initiative of VU University 
Amsterdam. Transaction management, i.e. 
the skill to keep transaction costs low and 
to create value in transactions, is the focus 
of the research of RITM. Expanding our 
knowledge on how to reduce transaction 
costs and on how to create value in various 
types of trade transactions is the major aim 
of RITM. Part of the research of RITM is 
sponsored by the ‘Transactieland.nl’ 
foundation
What is transaction management?
Ever since the 17th century, known as its 
Golden Age, the Netherlands succeeded 
remarkably well in keeping its leading 
position in world trade. Even today a 
considerable part of its welfare stems from 
trade and good skill in managing 
transactions, especially in this era of 
globalisation where supply chains become 
more and more fragmented. In this  
context trade should be seen in a broad 
sense as exchange of property rights.  
Many people in the Netherlands earn, 
directly or indirectly, money by conducting 
and enabling such transactions. This long  
lasting experience as a trading nation is a 
major reason for the establishment of 
RITM. 
Apart from comparative advantages in 
production, transaction costs are the main 
determinant of (international) trade flows. 
Similarly, differences in transaction costs 
are crucial for the location and investment 
decisions of firms on where to produce, 
and on where to organize and orchestrate 
production in their headquarters. So 
knowledge on transaction costs, and on 
how to manage these transactions, is vital 
for these trade and investment decisions. 
Therefore, efficient transaction management 
which reduces transaction costs, will make 
existing trade more profitable and will  
lead to more trade. It strengthens the 
competitive position of individual firms, 
and, through spill-over effects, of the  
whole nation so that it enhances welfare.  
In this way a reduction of transaction costs 
creates value for firms and society. The 
conundrum is that with lower transaction 
costs total transactions will rise more than 
proportionally, so that transaction costs  
will take a larger share of total costs. It 
enhances the importance and profitability 
of transaction management. Hence, shortly 
stated, transaction management is the 
ability to keep the costs of trade 
transactions as low as possible so that the 
value creation from these transactions is 
optimized.
Globalisation and information technology 
bring about rapid changes in the way trade 
transactions take place. It creates new  
trade opportunities. Therefore it is 
necessary that one should be aware of 
these changes and opportunities, and know 
how to react and invest in knowledge on 
transactions. For instance, formal barriers 
to trade, such as transport costs and  
import restrictions, will gradually disappear. 
It makes informal trade barriers such as 
cultural differences, legal infrastructure, 
rules and regulations of local governments, 
red tape and especially trust between 
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trading partners of more importance.
The more knowledge we have on these 
aspects, which is partly tacit knowledge, 
the better we can strengthen our position 
of managing transactions. In the world of 
globalisation and global (out)sourcing it is 
vital for companies to preserve the 
orchestrating function in the production, 
the demand and supply network. Major 
questions in this respect are: where and 
how can we buy ideas for new products 
and services, how do we obtain knowledge 
on making these products and providing 
these services, where do we find labour, 
and where and how can we continue and 
improve selling these products and services 
at the highest margin? Financing and risk 
management are an important part of  
that management function. Therefore, a 
major focus of the research on transaction 
management is to cope with cultural 
diversity. The ability to work together in 
such cultural diversity is one of the main 
assets of a good trader. 
Institutions play a major role in management 
of transactions. Different institutions may 
bring about different types of transaction 
management. A major example is whether 
transactions take place according to formal 
or informal contracts. Although globalization 
brings about some convergence of 
institutions, or to formulate it more 
specifically, some dominance in Anglo-
Saxon trade institutions, cultural, legal  
and social differences between the various 
countries and regions of the world will 
remain. Knowledge and feeling for these 
differences is of utmost importance for 
keeping transaction costs low in international 
trade relationships. The traditional position 
of the Netherlands as a trading nation is 
that of a meeting place for these different 
ways of trading. Therefore openness to 
these differences, and the possibility to 
establish links between the various 
institutions of trading, is a major focus of 
this research programme. It will help to 
confirm the position of the Netherlands  
as a focal point between the Anglo-Saxon, 
the European continental, the Middle 
Eastern and the Asian ways of trading. 
All in all, transaction management is  
not another management tool but a new 
approach, rooted in up to date economic 
theory, to enhance the efficiency of 
transactions
Which transaction costs?
Transaction costs are all costs made  
in trade transactions, either as an  
exchange of property rights in a market 
transaction, or as an exchange of 
responsibilities in a hierarchical situation.  
In other words transaction costs can be 
associated with the fuss and ado that 
occurs when purchasing or selling goods 
and services, when changing the location  
of production and splitting up the supply 
chain. An entrepreneur who is able to  
keep his transaction costs low, will be  
more successful to offer an attractive 
product to the market, as this type of  
costs plays a considerable role in 
international trade. In principle two types  
of transaction costs can be distinguished: 
the “hard” transaction costs and the “soft” 
transaction costs. The hard transaction 
costs relate to costs that are readily 
perceptible and quantifiable, such as 
transport charges, import levies and 
customs authorities tariffs. The soft 
transaction costs are much more difficult  
to observe and measure.  
One can think of all kinds of costs of 
making and checking contracts,  
information costs, costs because of  
cultural differences and communication 
failures, tacit knowledge on legal 
procedures, formation of trust and 
reputation, network building, costs 
associated with risks and with rules and 
regulation in order to reduce risks,  
security requirements etc. Now that the 
hard costs decrease because of trade 
liberalisation and lowering of transport 
charges, the soft costs become more 
important. Good entrepreneurship in  
trade is needed to valuate these soft 
transaction costs.
RITM’s the research programme
The research programme of RITM  
purports to study to what extent reduction 
of transaction costs and knowledge 
investments which foster reduction of 
transaction costs yield welfare gains.  
These knowledge investments may relate 
to the use of new technologies, cultural 
knowledge and networks in trade 
relationships. More specifically promoting 
the use of uniform standards can  
contribute considerably to a reduction 
transaction costs. Part of these effects  
may be external and imply a role for the 
government. Insight into these  
externalities may give a hint for the kind  
of innovation policy needed to foster the 
transaction sector. It should be mentioned 
that in a globalizing world, where the 
growth of world trade is structurally  
larger than real production growth, the 
transaction sector also becomes 
increasingly important in countries which 
are not specific trading nations. 
A country that has better abilities to  
reduce transaction costs than their 
competitors will acquire a relatively strong 
position in trade. The Dutch case may 
indeed be explained by the trading culture 
of being able to trade at low transaction 
costs. An example of this evidence is the 
large share in world trade, which cannot 
solely be explained by natural factors such 
as a favourable geographical position. 
Adam Smith already noted that the 
Netherlands has been an outstanding 
trading nation and earns a large part of  
its welfare by means of trade. The amount 
of trade can be enhanced when a further 
reduction of transaction costs can be 
achieved. Lower transaction costs lead  
to more trade and hence to more welfare. 
Such welfare increases are obtained both 
by making existing trade less expensive 
and by expanding trade. As a matter of 
fact, trade and division of labour are 
directly related. The division of labour  
and specialisation, which allows the use  
of technological advanced equipment,  
are a basic source for productivity growth. 
Yet the division of labour and the 
consequent fragmentation of production 
has its limits. More division of labour  
brings about more need for co-ordination, 
which leads to more transaction costs. 
Reducing these costs and innovations  
which make co-ordination and transaction 
less expensive, foster the division of labour 
and enhance productivity further. These 
welfare gains by reducing co-ordination 
costs can be acquired in the production.
The research programme draws heavily  
on recent developments in transaction 
costs economics and on the analysis of 
trade costs. The traditional neoclassical 
theory typically neglects the presence of 
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transaction costs. This (oftentimes  
implicit) reliance on frictionless trade is 
surprising for theories in which exchange  
is at the heart of the matter. For instance, 
today’s international trade flows,  
especially with respect to trade in services, 
can hardly be explained by traditional  
Ricardian models of international 
economics, which make trade flows 
dependent on comparative advantages  
in factor endowments. It is not so much 
comparative advantages in production 
factors, but more so in skills and  
performing tasks which determine today’s 
trade relationships. Heterogeneity with 
respect to productivity in product 
development, management of production, 
supply chain management, purchase and 
sales, is a major source of comparative 
advantages, which drives trade flows.  
The hypothesis of the programme is  
that the Netherlands and similarly other 
trading nations have a comparative 
advantage in the management of 
transactions, as they are mainly innovative 
in the design and implementation of 
technologies which reduce transaction 
costs. From that perspective the 
programme aims to investigate the 
relevance of transaction costs for 
understanding several of the empirical 
phenomena that are impossible to 
understand without relying on such costs. 
The programme centres around four  
areas of research in which transaction  
costs are dominant, viz.:
•  industrial organization with a focus on the 
determinants of the boundaries of the 
firm;
•  international trade with a focus on  
the multiple dimensions of transaction 
costs distinguishing between transport 
costs, institutional costs and cultural  
costs of exchange; 
•  foreign direct investments with a focus  
on outsourcing and the organization  
of the firm in a globalizing world; 
•  networks with a focus on the role of  
social and regional networks, and on 
standards as institutionalized settings  
that facilitate exchange of goods,  
ideas, etc.
The programme aims to create value  
both for individual firms and organisations 
participating in the programme and for  
the society as a whole. The value for 
individual firms participating in the 
programme is created through the 
reduction in costs that will be caused by  
the implementation of the methodology 
developed in the research, and through  
the value creation from that implementation. 
This value represents the total reduction  
in costs at the firms. Additional value for 
society is created through an increase in 
consumer surplus that is caused by the 
lower price of products and services 
following the reduction in transaction costs. 
Value for society is also created in two 
other ways. Firstly the programme will 
facilitate the development of several 
innovative ways of transaction  
management that are meant to be used 
publicly. This will contribute to a reduction 
of transaction costs between firms. This  
has a direct effect on the consumer  
prices of products and services. It will  
also induce more trade because the  
costs of trading are lower. The benefits  
of comparative advantages can therefore 
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be further exploited. These effects create 
societal value and improve societal welfare. 
Secondly the academic research on 
transaction management will increase 
attention for the further possibilities of 
innovation in this field. This increased 
attention is likely to cause an increase in 
the efforts to develop new methodologies 
and create value along these lines. The 
research is also expected to provide useful 
results and insights for companies and 
policy makers.
All in all this research programme seeks  
to acquire knowledge on how to exploit 
the challenges of globalisation and ICT  
for a further increase in the division of 
labour and therefore for more  
international welfare. Therefore, it is 
important to know how knowledge 
investments in the management and  
trade functions enable us to maintain  
in a proactive way comparative  
advantages in organising processes of 
buying, producing and selling goods and 
services. When doing so it is not a 
necessary condition that production  
itself takes place in the home country of 
(industrial) firms and companies. This is 
really in line of how firms in the 
industrialized world operate and create 
value. In this respect the important 
international role of the financial sector 
should be stressed. It seems that here there 
are still ample possibilities for innovations 
that reduce transaction costs. More 
knowledge on the dynamics of these 
innovations and their implications for trade, 
growth and welfare is required. This is a 
major purpose of this research programme.
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